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I. Introduction1
The ancient doctrine of cy pres, by which courts use their equitable
powers to modify the purposes of charitable trusts,2 has generated re-
newed scrutiny of late. This perennial favorite of scholarly dissection has
recently attracted popular attention in two sensational cases: the oil heir-
ess Beryl Buck's bequest to the San Francisco Foundation 3 and the New
1. The appendix to this paper is a supplementary introduction for those familiar with
my earlier forays into the nonprofit field. Knowledge of my earlier work is not, however, a
prerequisite for reading this Article.
2. Under the related doctrine of deviation, a court may alter the administrative or pro-
cedural-as opposed to substantive-provisions of a trust. As in other contexts, this distinc-
tion between substance and procedure is difficult to maintain. See Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1710-13 (1976). Scholars
have criticized the distinction on that ground, and on the additional ground that courts some-
times use the doctrine of deviation outside its technically proper realm of application as a
means of effecting substantive changes in trusts without meeting the more rigorous require-
ments of the cy pres doctrine. See Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., Cy Pres: A Proposal for Change,
47 B.U. L. REV. 153, 154-55 (1967); Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing
Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic Inter-
pretation to Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REV. 545, 565-66 (1989). This
debate need not concern us further, since the extreme limitation on dead hand control I recom-
mend would make the distinction between cy pres and deviation obsolete.
3. In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1986). Ms. Buck left a gift
valued at $7-10 million at the time of her death in 1975 to the San Francisco Foundation for
use in Main County, one of the nation's most affluent counties. When the value of the gift
increased to approximately $340 million, the Foundation sought to have the geographic scope
of the gift expanded to include other counties in the Bay Area. The result, according to one of
the Foundation's advisors, was "[h]yperbole, calumny, and apocalyptica .... The petition [for
modification] was characterized as a threat to the sanctity of wills and the health of philan-
thropy, and as an offense against capitalism, the American way of life, and God." John G.
Simon, American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 641 (1987). For
further commentary on the Buck case, see Ronald H. Malone et al., The Buck Trust Trial-A
Litigator's Perspective, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 585 (1987) (discussing the results of the case and
relevant pretrial and trial developments); Douglas J. Maloney, The Aftermath, 21 U.S.F. L.
REV. 681 (1987) (explaining the settlement agreement reached in Buck); Frederic D. Schrag,
Comment, Cy Pres Inexpediency and the Buck Trust, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 577 (1986) (proposing
a model cy pres statute); Roger G. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charita-
ble Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635 (1988) (examining the outer
limits of the cy pres doctrine).
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York Yacht Club's America's Cup Race.4 These cases underscore the
long-lamented flaws of existing cy pres doctrine and give renewed impe-
tus to its scholarly re-examination. Yet the British Parliament, after an
extensive study of the issue, recently concluded that the doctrine, though
not entirely satisfactory, should not be further reformed.5 This Article
analyzes why the push for reform has reached an impasse and suggests
an alternative route.
Cy pres has long been attacked as insufficiently attuned to societal
needs, as not flexible enough to permit the kind of judicially supervised
updating of charities needed to ensure the socially optimal use of charita-
4. The America's Cup litigation involved a series of suits to determine what types of
craft were appropriate entries under the Club's Deed of Gift, a trust instrument that sets out
the rules of the race. For a detailed account of the course of the litigation, see Johnson &
Taylor, supra note 2,, at 555-60.
5. The British Home Secretary and Economic Secretary to the Treasury jointly commis-
sioned Sir Philip Woodfield to conduct "an efficiency scrutiny of the supervision of charities."
Charities: A Framework For The Future 3 (1989) [hereinafter White Paper]. Published in 1987,
the Woodfield Report was the most comprehensive study since the Nathan Committee in 1952.
It noted problems with the Charity Commission's application of cy pres under the Charities
Act of 1960 and recommended that "(t]he Commission should consult widely on possible ways
of relaxing the ey pres doctrine and advise the Home Secretary whether legislation would be
desirable." SIR PHILIP WOODFIELD ET AL., EFFICIENCY SCRUTINY OF THE SUPERVISION OF
CHARITIES 32 (1987) [hereinafter WOODFIELD REPORT]. The Government accepted the
Woodfield Report and directed a White Paper to implement its recommendations by setting
out detailed legislative proposals and conducting the suggested studies. W1hite Paper, supra, at
3. On the issue of cy pres reform, the White Paper concluded:
Having looked at this question closely and consulted widely the Charity Com-
missioners take the view, and the Government accept, that legislation would not be
appropriate. The problem lies not so much with the doctrine, which has an inbuilt
flexibility, nor in the scope of the 1960 charities legislation [which placed the exercise
of a somewhat liberalized ey pres power in the hands of the Charity Commission], as
in the doctrine's application. Moreover, the flexibility of cy-pres is such that, as with
the definition of charity, legislation would be positively undesirable, inhibiting its
evolution and narrowing its scope.
Id. at 37. The White Paper thus put flexibility forward as cy pres's best face and fretted over
scarring it with reform. The White Paper went on, however, to concede that this face is not
without its flaws: "Such flexibility does of course bring with it the risk of confusion and incon-
sistencies in practice." Id. The proposed remedy for these flaws is superficial, if not cosmetic:
"The Charity Commission will, therefore, be reviewing its precedent systems and the guidance
which is given to staff." Id In thus rejecting more radical reform, the White Paper made
explicit its commitment to the basic structure of traditional cy pres, stating that the Commis-
sion's "aim will be to promote, across the board, a flexible and imaginative approach, consis-
tent with due regard for the donor's wishes." Ia Interestingly, the Woodfield Report
suggested a trustee-directed application of cy pres with respect to small charities; this antici-
pates in broad outline what I recommend for more general application in Part V, infra.
WOODFIELD REPORT, supra, at 32, 34. The White Paper adopted this proposal, White Paper,
supra, at 34-36, and it is now embodied in Sections 43 and 44 of the 1992 Charities Act.
Charities Act, 1992, ch. 41 (Eng.).
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ble assets.6 Recently, the doctrine has been attacked from a diametri-
cally opposed position, as being insufficiently attuned to the donor's
intent.7 This debate produces insolvable dilemmas that can only be
avoided by expanding the analytic framework to include a third, mediat-
ing position: placing control of charitable assets in the hands of charities
themselves, subject neither to legally enforceable donor control nor to
state-imposed modification.
To understand the dilemmas the current debate produces, we must
examine the compromise of which the cy pres doctrine itself is a corol-
lary. At the root of the doctrine is an effort to balance the public benefits
of charitable gifts against the donors' desires for perpetual control of the
donated property. As a general rule, the state limits dead hand control
through the rule against perpetuities, under which property owners can
dictate the use and enjoyment of amassed societal wealth for roughly a
century after death." The rule strikes a balance between a property
owner's desire to exercise control from beyond the grave and a perceived
societal interest in having the use of resources determined by the living.
In the case of gifts to charity, however, the state strikes a more gen-
erous bargain with donors. Donors get to extend their control indefi-
nitely, with state assurance as well as permission. The state not only
allows perpetual dead hand control, but also monitors and enforces it.
The reason for this relative generosity in the case of charitable gifts is an
implicit quid pro quo: In exchange for perpetual donor control, society
gets wealth devoted to recognizably "public" purposes. Wealth that do-
nors would otherwise pass to individuals for "private" purposes is in a
sense devoted to the public domain. Thus the restraints the law allows to
6. See, e.g., EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PREs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 159
(1950); LEWIS SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 121-32 (1955); C. Ronald
Chester, Cy Pres. A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L.J. 407, 417, 424-25 (1979); Edith L. Fisch,
Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 393 (1959) [hereinafter Fisch, Chang-
ing Concepts]; Vanessa Laird, Note, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable
Intent in the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973, 979-80 (1988); Sisson,
supra note 3, at 648-51.
7. Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J.
295, 314 (1988).
8. In the notoriously arcane language of the rule against perpetuities, an interest must
vest or fail within a life in being at the time of the creation of the interest, plus twenty-one
years. See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 504 (1988). I
arrived at my approximation of the duration of dead hand control under the rule by assuming
the creating instrument to be a will and the measuring life to be an infant alive at the testator's
death. If the child lives a bit past the Biblical three score and ten, now an actuarially sound
assumption, the additional twenty-one years of the rule puts the time of dead hand control
right around the century mark.
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endure are not wholly idiosyncratic; they must advance purposes that the
courts, as custodians of the commonweal, certify as publicly beneficial.9
The doctrine of cy pres is designed to maintainthis balance between
dead hand control and public benefit, to ensure that the original bargain
between the donor and society is kept reasonably current. If, after the
gift has been made, a change in circumstances threatens either side of the
bargain-the execution of the donor's purpose or the resulting public
benefit-courts may modify the trust to restore the balance,10 Under
current cy pres doctrine, however, this power of modification is closely
circumscribed: The degree of frustration must be relatively great, the
donor must have at least implicitly assented to the change, and the de-
gree of change must be relatively small."1 This last condition gives the
doctrine its name. In modifying the trust's purpose, the court must fol-
low the donor's original purpose as closely as possible--cy pres comme
possible, in the Norman French of the early equity courts. 12
Traditional cy pres reformers-those who seek to make the doctrine
more flexible-convincingly argue that these conditions are unduly con-
straining. 13 The reformers have failed, however, to strike a satisfactory
balance between public benefit and dead hand control. On the one hand,
present reform leaves too much deference to donor control; on the other,
it places too much confidence in the courts as guarantors of the public
benefits that charitable trusts are supposed to provide. Proposals to in-
crease the flexibility of cy pres thus result in an unstable compromise
between absolute dead hand control and unfettered judicial discretion.
This is inevitable, as long as the options are limited to two: continued
dead hand control or state-administered modification. The way out of
this dilemma is to consider a third option: Eliminate legal enforcement
of dead hand control and leave the disposition of charitable assets to the
9. See SIMEs, supra note 6, at 116-17.
10. Cy pres can also be applied to new gifts, most commonly in the case of bequests.
Here, typically owing to the lapse of time between death and the execution of the will, the
donor would have been unaware when the gift became effective of circumstances that would
preclude the precise execution of his or her wishes within the confines of legally defined chari-
table purposes. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431, at 107 (rev. 2d ed. repl. vol. 1991); 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN
SCOTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399, at 478 (4th ed. 1989)
(quoting the MODEL ACT CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
DEVISES, AND BEQUESTS (1944)).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1957).
12. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, § 431, at 95.
13. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399.
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discretion of their trustees,14 subject only to the constraint that they be
used for charitable purposes.
Part II of this Article identifies the dilemmas cy pres reformers inev-
itably face in trying to work within the bipolar framework of traditional
cy pres doctrine, in which any diminution of dead hand control brings a
corresponding increase in state involvement. Part III suggests that the
need for legal enforcement of dead hand control is not nearly as critical
as cy pres reformers have assumed. Part IV argues that the notion of
charitable efficiency, the standard by which reformers hope to expand the
limits of cy pres while constraining judicial discretion, is inadequate.
Building on these criticisms of cy pres reform, Part V sets forth my pro-
posal to eliminate legal enforcement of dead hand control and outlines
how this suggestion could both avoid the old dilemmas and strengthen
the independence of the third, nonprofit sector, a traditional alternative
to for-profit and governmental provision of goods and services. This sug-
gestion is not, however, without problems of its own. The more pressing
of these are addressed as they arise and the remainder are discussed in
Part VI.
II. The Twin Problems of Reformed Cy Pres
To see the twin problems of reformed cy pres in proper perspective,
we must step back and look at "pure" cy pres. This is a model that
shows how cy pres would work if its sole function were to maintain as
strictly as possible the compromise of which we have seen it to be the
corollary: the implicit bargain between dead donors and society's living
members. 15 Having examined the "pure" cy pres model, we can appreci-
ate why reformers have asked more of the doctrine, and why within its
14. I am using "trustees" here and elsewhere, except as noted, as shorthand for a char-
ity's internal governing body, whether that body is technically one or more trustees, as in the
case of a charitable trust, or a board of directors, as in the case of a charitable corporation.
Although the doctrine of cy pres evolved in the charitable trust context, it now generally
applies to charitable corporations as well. At some risk of oversimplification, the corporation
is treated as the trustee of assets held in the corporate name. See sources cited infra note 123
(discussing whether to treat gifts to charitable corporations as absolute or as gifts in trust).
The fact that the internal governance of charities can be quite complex is a problem I treat
separately in Part VI.A., infra.
15. The "pure" cy pres model is a heuristic device, rather than an accurate historical
reconstruction or an accurate statement of existing law; the cy pres doctrine as currently ap-
plied in the United States has already moved too far in the direction of reform to serve as a
useful starting point for analysis.
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traditional framework they have had trouble making it meet their
demands.1 6
A. The Pure Cy Pres Model
The "pure" cy pres analysis would be a fairly straightforward, three-
step process, with a minimum of play in the joints. First, the court
would determine whether the bargain between society and the donor had
failed on one side or the other.17 On the donor's side, the bargain might
fail because the donor's original intent cannot be carried out or, to use
the standard phrase, becomes impossible, in a fairly literal sense. For
example, polio is eliminated, as in the case of the March of Dimes,1 8 or
the Thirteenth Amendment frees the slaves, as in the case of Francis
Jackson's famous abolitionist bequest.19 On the public side, the bargain
fails when the donor's purpose ceases to be charitable, and thus no longer
confers the public benefit that was the implicit condition of allowing it to
continue in perpetuity. This would be the case, for example, with respect
to charitable trusts involving invidious racial discrimination.20
In the face of such failure, the court would reach the second step of
the analysis. For the assets in question to be applied to a new, court-
determined charitable purpose under the cy pres doctrine, the donor's
charitable intent must be shown to have been general rather than specific.
The donor, that is, must be shown to have preferred having the assets
applied to a new, court-determined charitable purpose rather than paid
over to specified private or charitable default takers or, in the absence of
specificity on that score, into the hands of the donor's heirs or residuary
16. In taking this last step, we will avoid the besetting sin of heuristic devices: their
tendency to degenerate into straw men.
17. Short of some such failure, the trust would go on as the donor intended.
18. See generally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, § 438, at 168 n.15 (discussing the
application of cy pres when a disease has been eliminated).
19. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
20. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (declaring racially discrim-
inatory policies inconsistent with charitable status under common law and federal income tax
law); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that under 1964 Civil Rights Act,
private, commercial, nonsectarian schools cannot deny admission to blacks); Pennsylvania v.
Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (holding that administration of the racially re-
strictive Girard College trust by the city of Philadelphia violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
For a discussion of the Girard College trust, see Scowr & FRATCHER, supra note 10, § 399.4A;
Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66
YALE L.J. 979 (1957). See also Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable Orga-
nizations, 3 VA. TAX REv. 291 (1984) (discussing trust law and how public policy considera-
tions can be taken into account); Stuart M. Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Discriminating Look at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272
(1967) (exploring the various approaches to state action used by the courts in the area of
racially discriminatory charitable trusts).
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legatees. Here again, there need not be much room for doubt; in the
absence of pretty clear evidence of general charitable intent or an express
provision for a gift over to another charitable purpose, the charitable
trust would fail and its corpus would pass back into private hands.
If there were evidence of general charitable intent, the court would
reach the third step of the process, from which the doctrine derives its
name. The court at this stage is to modify the terms of the trust, depart-
ing from the original purpose only so much as is necessary to avoid its
frustration or, to look at it the other way, staying as close to that purpose
as possible.
B. The Reformers' Critique of the "Pure" Model
Were cy pres to be applied in the "pure" form, it would encounter
few operational difficulties. To be sure, interpretive issues would arise at
each level in each case, but the doctrine would give conscientious courts
and anxious donors more than adequate guidance-as much guidance as
most common-law rules.
The problems for reformers would lie elsewhere, not in the doc-
trine's procedural machinery, but rather in its substantive outcomes. In
brief, it would be oriented too much toward donors' wishes and too little
toward the public's benefit. What is, in the eyes of reformers, a patently
wasteful charity by contemporary standards can continue unmodified un-
less the donor's contrary wish can be proved. And even if the donor's
wishes can be shown to have been frustrated or to have fallen outside the
contemporary scope of charity, there is the further hurdle of showing
that the donor would have wanted to keep the donated assets in the char-
itable sphere rather than to have them pass to private default takers. Fi-
nally, even if the donor's original intent could be shown to have been
frustrated and even if a general charitable intent could be established,
pure cy pres would only permit the smallest possible modification of the
donor's original purpose. Such a change, from the reformist perspective,
might well be from bad to less bad, but could not by its own terms be
from bad to best, from wasteful to socially optimal or, to use the reform-
ists' preferred term, charitably efficient. 21 This poses what I take to be
the central problem for reformers: how to reformulate cy pres doctrine
to promote charitable efficiency without upsetting the terms of the under-
lying bargain between donors and society.
21. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of charitable
efficiency).
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C. The Reformers' Dilemmas
Cy pres as actually applied by the courts involves each of the three
determinations required by the "pure" cy pres model: whether the do-
nor's original purpose has been frustrated, whether the donor had a gen-
eral charitable intent, and how far from the donor's original purpose to
depart.22 At each of these steps, traditional cy pres reformers have three
options: they can look for the subjective intent of the donor; they can
invoke an objective standard of efficiency; or they can try a hybrid ap-
proach. Each of these options is problematic.
Reformers may, first, look to a donor's subjective intent, in the hope
of finding an actual preference for charitable efficiency on the part of
donors themselves. In the event that their purposes become inefficient,
would they feel that their side of the original bargain had been frus-
trated? If so, would they want the funds to remain in a charitable use?
And if so, how far from their original purposes would they want the
court to go in the name of efficiency?
There are two problems with seeking subjective intent. First, the
donor's subjective intent is almost by definition not known.2 3 Worse,
however, is the second problem, the situation in which the donor's atti-
tude toward efficiency is known to be indifference or even disdain.
Rather than have their original charitable designs retailored to fit reform-
ers' tastes for efficiency, donors might prefer to have their donated assets
either mothballed in their outworn patterns or handed down to private,
noncharitable recipients. "Never mind justice," such donors would in-
sist, "much less some new-fangled notion of efficiency; let my wil -be
done, though the skies fall."
Both these problems with seeking donors' subjective preferences for
efficiency suggest the second approach open to reformers. That approach
is to invoke efficiency without proof of donors' real preferences, in one of
two ways: either as what "average" or "reasonable" donors would have
wanted had they foreseen the situation, 24 or as what society, with the
same foresight, would have required as a condition of doing the deal in
the first place.25 In the former, weaker form, the appeal to efficiency is
22. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTs § 399 (1957).
23. See Laird, supra note 6, at 977-87.
24. This was John Simon's suggestion for resolving the Buck trust problem. See Simon,
supra note 3, at 647-49. See also ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 225-26 (London,
Chatto & Windus 1880) (arguing that most donors would favor reform in light of unforesee-
able events).
25. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110(a) (1975) (codifying this presumption of gen-
eral charitable intent); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, § 436, at 133 (urging presumption
of general charitable intent at the second stage of cy pres analysis).
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intent-inferring, rather than intent-honoring. A court faced with an ob-
solescent charity and the absence of clear donor directions infers that the
donor would have wanted to promote efficiency from the fact that simi-
larly situated donors usually do. In the latter, stronger form, the court
makes no such effort to infer intent, imposing efficiency without apology.
In either version, however, imposing the criterion of efficiency with-
out establishing that to be the donor's subjective intent produces a di-
lemma of its own. Once prospective donors know of the weak, intent-
inferring version, they can anticipatorily opt out, either in favor of con-
tinued eccentricity (up to the outer limits of charity)26 or in favor of gifts
over to private beneficiaries, neither of which is particularly appealing to
cy pres reformers. But if the strong, intent-overriding version is applied,
donors may simply choose private giving or consumption rather than
charitable giving in the first place, an even worse prospect from the re-
formist perspective.
There is, finally, a somewhat disingenuous third approach, an un-
happy synthesis of the first two, somewhere between seeking a subjective
preference for efficiency and resorting to an objective surrogate for that
preference. Under this approach, courts would impose the irrebuttable
presumption of efficiency, or something close to it, all the while insisting
that it is what donors really want, even in the face of pretty clear evi-
dence to the contrary. Present law is often faulted with falling into this
position, both by those concerned with infringement of donors' real
wishes27 and by those eager for the law to espouse the presumption of
efficiency more overtly and aggressively. 28 The charge is not without
foundation. 29 The supposed advantage-not to say virtue-of this posi-
tion would be to pay lip service to subjective donor intent out of one side
of the judicial mouth while advancing social goals out of the other. But
to the extent that this approach becomes known, or perhaps even sus-
pected, it will incur a double cost. Like the strong presumption of a
donor preference for efficiency, it risks turning away prospective donors.
In addition, it undermines the judiciary's candor and credibility.
26. Donors, that is to say, might specify that they want their idiosyncratic wishes fol-
lowed, no matter how inefficient or extravagant or outlandish their wishes come to appear over
time, up to the point at which those wishes fall outside the evolving outer limits of the defini-
tion of charity.
27. Macey, supra note 7, at 314.
28. Chester, supra note 6, at 425; Comment, A Revaluation ofCy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303,
322 (1939).
29. According to Scott, trusts that are charitable when established are rarely held to fail
and revert to private hands in the United States, and reputedly never held to do so in England.
ScoTr" & FRATCHER, supra note 10, at 518-19.
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D. Summary
In the face of these dilemmas, cy pres reformers generally recom-
mend a middle ground: a modest extension of cy pres' applicability to
the more egregiously wasteful charities, but not a wholesale overhaul of
all charities that fail a stringent test of efficiency. 30 In so doing, however,
they are both too pessimistic, in their fears of disregarding donors' intent,
and too optimistic, in their hope of giving viable content to the notion of
charitable efficiency. On the one hand, they wrongly assume that dimin-
ishing legal protection of dead hand control will bring shame or disaster
to the cause of charity. On the other, they wrongly assume that the con-
cept of charitable efficiency will make a modest degree of reform feasible.
Part III examines the overly pessimistic assumption; Part IV, the overly
optimistic.
M. The Reformers' Overly Pessimistic Assumption-The
Dangers of Diminished Legal Protection for Donor
Intent
The suggestion that donor intent be denied legal enforcement raises
three distinct but related objections. The first is that disregarding do-
nors' intent is inherently wrong, either because it deprives donors of
property rights or, more generally, because it involves the breaking of
commitments, irrespective of the consequences. 31
The second and third objections concern the consequences of break-
ing commitments. The second is that disregarding donor intent will have
an adverse effect on charitable giving; once donors know their intentions
can be disregarded without legal penalty, they will be less inclined to
give.32 The third objection is concerned with the adverse consequences
for overall social productivity. The fear is that potential donors, realiz-
ing they may no longer use their wealth to create charitable gifts subject
to their perpetual control, will be discouraged from earning the money in
the first place. As a result, society will be deprived to that extent of their
labor and its fruits. In the terms of economic analysis, prospective do-
nors, faced with this diminution in the subjective value of what they re-
30. See, eg., SIMES, supra note 6, at 139; John S. Bradway, Tendencies in the Application
of the Cy-Pres Doctrine, 5 TEMP. L.Q. 489, 514-15, 528-29 (1931); Chester, supra note 6, at
424; Fisch, Changing Concepts, supra note 6, at 393; Laird, supra note 6, at 985-87; Sisson,
supra note 3, at 651-53.
31. See, eg., Johnson & Taylor, supra note 2, at 567-68.
32. See, eg., Simon, supra note 3, at 662-63 (arguing against this objection as applied to a
moderate liberalization of cy pres).
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ceive for their labor, will be inclined at the margin to consume more of
their labor as leisure and sell less of it to others in the market.33
A. Bringing the Objections into Focus
All three of these objections get much of their purchase from two
related misunderstandings. The first is the confusion of the legally unen-
forceable with the legally prohibited. To say that a restriction on the use
of charitable funds is legally unenforceable is not to say that the law
forbids honoring the restriction. Consider, for example, the status of ra-
cially restrictive covenants in real estate deeds. In the wake of Shelley v.
Kraemer,34 such covenants were no longer enforceable in court. But that
did not mean, as a matter of either logic or law, that they were unen-
forceable privately, by moral suasion or neighborhood pressure. 35 They
eventually did become illegal as well as legally unenforceable, but only by
special legislative action. 36
The other misunderstanding is the confusion of moral with legal ob-
ligation. To say that dead hand restrictions on charitable gifts should be
legally unenforceable is not to say that these restrictions should not be
heeded by the recipients of the gifts on moral grounds. Most of us feel
compelled, morally or socially or otherwise, to keep a wide range of com-
mitments that are not legally binding upon us. We send our parents
birthday cards; we give to the church or synagogue of our choice (and
sometimes even attend its services); we respond to our alma maters' calls
to alms.
33. This parable of the lost talents comes from the gospel of the law and economics cru-
sade, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 510 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. See also Macey, supra note 7, at 297-99 (noting that regula-
tion of a settlor's disposal of wealth will decrease the incentive to accumulate wealth). Though
I use "labor" in the text, since it is the most intuitively clear example, a parallel substitution
effect could occur with respect to capital: Consumption would tend to displace savings and
investment. Posner, accordingly, uses the more general term "accumulate wealth," which cov-
ers both selling one's labor and investing one's capital.
34. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
35. See LORRAINE HANSBERRY, A RAISIN IN THE SUN (1958), for a poignant depiction
of both the social pressure and the moral force that backed such restrictions in the immediate
aftermath of Shelley.
36. This occurred under the Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82
Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)), and earlier in some states
under their own statutes. RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 394, 436 (4th ed.
1991). See also Steven R. Swanson, Discriminatory Charitable Trusts: Time for a Legislative
Solution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 153 (1986) (proposing a model antidiscrimination statute that
expresses the legislature's opinion on the proper equilibrium between the grantor's and soci-
ety's wishes and authorizes courts to delete sexually or racially discriminatory provisions from
charitable trusts).
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B. Answering the Objections
With these two misunderstandings removed, we can now turn to the
objections themselves. The third objection-the danger to overall social
productivity-is the least compelling, and can be dispensed with rather
quickly. Even if donors were unable to make gifts to charity subject to
perpetual, legally enforceable restrictions, the range of their options for
disposing of their wealth during life or at death would not be significantly
diminished. They could still use their wealth in ways that seem in fact to
be more popular than making restricted charitable gifts: personal con-
sumption, private gifts, and unrestricted charitable gifts. 37 Given these
remaining (and apparently more popular) options, it is unlikely that
wealth accumulators would be much deterred in amassing their
fortunes.3 8
What, then, of the objection that disregarding donor intent is inher-
ently wrong?39 This objection, as suggested above, has two forms: One
concentrates on property rights; the other focuses, more broadly, on hon-
oring commitments. The suggestion that disregarding donors' intent is
wrong because it interferes with their property rights in some absolute,
natural law sense must, for present purposes, be put in its place rather
37. See generally Arthur H. White, Patterns of Giving, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING:
STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 65-71 (Richard Magat ed., 1989) (examining patterns of
charitable giving).
38, Two other points about the problem of deterring wealth accumulation should be
noted. First, dead hand control creates costs that may offset its beneficial stimulation of pro-
ductivity, though to an extent disputed among economic analysts themselves. Compare Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 33, at 508-12 (arguing that containing these costs,
particularly those associated with locking resources into undesirable uses, provides economic
justification for the traditional cy pres doctrine) with Macey, supra note 7, at 303-06 (arguing
that without cy pres intervention donors can deal at least as efficiently with these costs as the
courts).
The second point is that even if interfering with dead hand control is at odds with the goal
of wealth maximization, that is hardly the end of the story. Wealth maximization is neither
the only social value (if it is an intelligible value at all, see Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, 9 L LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980)), nor the social value most commonly associated with
charities. As I will discuss more fully, charities have traditionally been concerned at least as
much with wealth distribution as wealth accumulation. See infra text accompanying notes 89-
93.
39. Arthur Hobhouse, an early critic of dead hand control, nicely captured both the sub-
stance and the spirit of this objection:
And what between hazy notions about a natural right of posthumous gift, and hazy
notions about the motives for making such gifts, aided by the rigidity of legal maxims
and a certain magical effect of the word 'Charity,' it was very generally concluded, or
felt, that we have no right to ask questions whether compliance with a Founder's
directions is useless or injurious to society, but that as long as those directions can
possibly be obeyed, they shall be.
HoBHousE, supra note 24, at 220.
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than rebutted, for it proves too much. Society, through the legal system,
restricts dead hand control dramatically in noncharitable transfers
through the rule against perpetuities and allied doctrines. Unless we are
to revisit long-standing and deeply entrenched limits on dead hand con-
trol across the whole field of property law, we must, for present purposes,
take the general legitimacy of restricting dead hand control as given.40
The broader wrongfulness argument, which focuses on the general
obligation to honor commitments, loses much of its force as soon as we
distinguish moral from legal obligation. Not only do we feel obliged on
nonlegal grounds to honor legally unenforceable commitments; through
a variety of nonlegal mechanisms, obligations of this kind are quite fre-
quently enforced, both in the context of charitable giving and in other
contexts.
The interactions between charities and their constituents-mem-
bers, donors, and others-often involve recourse to informal enforcement
techniques. Charitable organizations frequently use extralegal pressures
to encourage their members to make contributions-pressures that may
be more or less formalized (and more or less subtle). 41 These enforce-
ment mechanisms may well be more effective than recourse to the legal
system, even when that recourse is available. 42 Hence, in a neighboring
precinct within the nonprofit sector, social clubs post the names of delin-
quent members on the dining room door. And in the heartland of char-
40. For a discussion of the natural law arguments in favor of free testation and legally
protected dead hand control, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory
of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6-7, 15-16 (1992). For a brief survey of the general argu-
ments against natural law normative theories, see Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Moral-
ity For Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853, 872-89 (1992) [hereinafter Atkinson, New Role Morality]
(particularly Part II, "A Metaethical Interlude"). For my response to the less sweeping argu-
ment that abolition of dead hand control would violate the constitutional restrictions on taking
private property or impairing the obligations of contracts, see infra Part VI.E.
41. See BARRY P. KEATING & MARYANN 0. KEATING, NoT-FOR-PROFIT 71-75 (1980)
(emphasizing that it is difficult to get members to "pay-up voluntarily," that individuals want
to receive the benefits of the nonprofit (or "pressure group") without paying dues, and that
small organizations often use social sanctions quite effectively to "coerce" their members into
supporting group goals). See generally Geraldine Fennell, Persuasion: Marketing as a Behav-
ioral Science in Business and Non-Business Contexts, in I ADVANCES IN NONPROFIT MARKET-
ING 95-160 (Russel W. Belk ed., 1985) (describing marketing persuasion; distinguishing it from
coercion, brainwashing, and therapy; and reviewing its potential as a method of increasing
donor contributions); Henry C. Suhrke, A Preview of "Pledges to Non-Profit Organizations: Are
They Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced?", THE PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Dec. 1991,
at 44 (previewing a forthcoming study of problems with the legal enforceability of pledges to
nonprofit organizations).
42. For the proposition that informal enforcement mechanisms persist even when state
enforcement is available, see David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships,
104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 376-78 (1990), and Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the
State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN. 5, 24-25 (1985).
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ity, educational institutions have created elaborate systems of moral
obligation loans. Students receive financial aid in return for commit-
ments--explicitly designed not to be legally enforceable-to make offset-
ting "contributions" after graduation.43
While charities use such informal means to control their constitu-
ents, the converse is also true: Donors themselves have long used infor-
mal means to constrain charities. Indeed, extralegal pressure by donors
is the historic foundation of the charitable trust, which donors developed
to compensate for the nonenforceability of use restrictions in the early
English law courts. Donors had to rely on social (and eventually ecclesi-
astical) pressures on the titular owners of the donated property, the pred-
ecessors of modem trustees, for enforcement of their charitable wishes. 44
The same absence of legal enforceability was initially true of private
as well as charitable trusts,4 5 and extralegal enforcement mechanisms re-
main important well beyond the bounds of the nonprofit sector. Ellick-
son, for example, has noted the role that informal notions of
neighborliness play in land use control,46 and Charny and others have
explored the continued importance of nonlegal sanctions in the context
of commercial transactions. 47 These are part of a long-standing tradition
of extrajudicial dispute resolution in the United States.48 The contempo-
rary alternative dispute resolution movement can be seen as an effort,
43. See Gail Jordan Hupper, Note, Moral Obligation FinancialAid Programs: A Section
170 Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1402, 1403-06 (1984).
44. ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 10, § 348.2, at 27-28. The absence of legal enforce-
ability was in some respects advantageous to the earliest known charitable beneficiaries in
England, the Franciscan friars, because it lent credibility to the claim that their collective vow
of poverty remained inviolate. Id. See also REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IM-
MORAL SOCIETY 6 (1932) (noting that churches have traditionally used excommunication and
the interdict as means of coercing their members).
45. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 87-88
(198 1); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 53-54 (2d ed. 1986). Contemporary
estate planners may have brought this process around full circle. See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK
& MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR DISABLED CLIENT 12-33 to 12-36
(1992) (recommending "moral obligation gifts" to the caretakers of disabled family members
to avoid complexities of creating and administering legally enforceable trusts).
46. In his early treatment, Ellickson was not very sanguine about the use of informal
mechanisms in large, mobile, and generally unneighborly countries like the United States. See
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 685-86 (1973). Subsequent empirical studies led him to
acknowledge that informal enforcement plays a much larger role. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHoUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Robert C. Ellickson,
Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 623, 628, 685 (1986).
47. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 42, at 425-26.
48. Auerbach writes of the early colonists' reliance on extralegal remedies to settle con-
flicts or community disputes, and their reluctance to view law as anything but an "alien value
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often supported by the state and even the courts, to move a wide range of
disputes outside formal judicial fora, sometimes out of the purview of
state resolution entirely.49 Enforcement of agreements must frequently
rely on nonstate mechanisms, for reasons that range from the absence of
adequate suprastate institutions in international law to the difficulties
criminals and criminal organizations such as the Mafia have invoking
state sanctions to guarantee honor among thieves. 50 Indeed, at the most
general level of analysis, it can be objected that focusing on the state as
the sole source of legal obligation and enforcement-the legacy of legal
positivism-is a fundamental jurisprudential mistake. Theories opposing
positivism insist that, properly understood, the legal system itself in-
cludes the kinds of nonstate enforcement mechanisms I have labelled
"extralegal" to indicate that they do not directly invoke the authority or
power of the state.51
system, one antithetical to Christianity itself." JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT
LAw? 22 (1983). He argues:
In colonial society non-legal dispute settlement expressed a strong communitarian
impulse that was vastly different from anything most contemporary Americans
would find familiar, or comfortable .... The tighter the communal bonds, the less
need there was for lawyers or courts. Colonists who rejected law made a self-con-
scious choice.... [T]hey preferred to live within a communal framework that ren-
dered formal legal institutions superfluous or even dangerous. For them, law was a
necessary evil or a last resort, not a preferred choice.
Id. at 19-20. To invoke this tradition is not, of course, to invite its wholesale return. As
Auerbach documents, a concomitant cost of pervasive reliance on informal, communitarian
dispute resolution was the loss of privacy and autonomy, and the risk of "coerced conformity."
Id. at 45. To return to informal controls in the very narrow context of cy pres reform is hardly
to incur such broad societal costs.
49. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985) (provid-
ing a general overview of alternative dispute resolution); Sally Engle Merry, Disputing Without
Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (1987) (reviewing GOLDBERG, supra). For an analysis of
the historical development of the alternative dispute resolution movement over the last twenty-
five years, see AUERBACH, supra note 48, at 115-37; Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985). For a criticism of the ADR
movement and a reply, compare Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075
(1984) (arguing that settlements do not reflect the social values found in substantive law) with
Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985)
(arguing that settlement calls on substantive community values).
50. See Kronman, supra note 42, at 5-6, 9 (summarizing literature on methods of infor-
mally enforcing agreements and the contexts in which these methods are employed). Accord-
ing to Kronman, the common theme of this diverse literature is "the opportunities that
individuals exploit, and the arrangements they invent, to enhance the security of their agree-
ments where no legal remedies for breach exist (or where those that do are plainly inade-
quate)." Id. at 6.
51. This is the view, for example, of sociological jurisprudence. See EUGEN EHRLICH,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 61-82 (1936). It also finds expres-
sion in the works of the Legal Realists, see, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON
HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE
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Charities and their apologists explicitly hold themselves to a higher
standard of conduct than the legally enforceable.5 2 Such claims cannot
be readily dismissed as window-dressing, at least in the context of honor-
ing donor restrictions. Here, several related factors suggest that a system
of nonstate-enforced compliance would serve donors to charity. For one
thing, the trustees of a particular charity share one fear with cy pres
reformers: a policy of departing too far from donors' wishes risks alien-
ating future donors. This is the message, for example, that parishioners
send their clergy through collection plate boycotts. The prospect that
trustees would be thus chastened in the use of legal power to depart from
donor wishes should diminish the fear of cy pres reformers about giving
trustees that power. Indeed, the wilier charitable trustees are, the more
appropriate guardians they may be for the henhouse of charitable dona-
tions, whose inhabitants produce golden eggs.53 And of course, trustees
would not be left entirely to their own devices. Their discretion would be
corralled by the outer limits of charity and nonprofit status, and the gov-
ernment would still be around to foreclose cruder forms of vulpine be-
havior through the nondistribution constraint. 54
239-69 (1941), and their successors, the "New Haven School" of McDougal, Lasswell, and
Reisman, see, eg., W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in MYREs S. Mc-
DOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1 (1981). As Kronman says in the
particular context of enforcing agreements: "[Tihe difference between the state and... vari-
ous private techniques... should be thought of not as a difference in kind but as a difference in
relative cost .... ." Kronman, supra note 42, at 28.
Interestingly, the law itself sometimes explicitly recognizes the effectiveness of agreements
that are not legally binding. Thus, for example, those who have retained nonlegally enforcea-
ble interests in transferred property are taxed as the owners of those interests under the federal
transfer taxes. See cases cited infra note 146. And although agreements to commit crimes are
unenforceable and often void, JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 22-1, at 889 (3d ed. 1987), such agreements are nonetheless punishable as
crimes under the law of conspiracy, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL
LAW § 6.4, at 525 (2d ed. 1986).
52. See INDEPENDENT SECTOR, ETHICS AND THE NATION'S VOLUNTARY AND PHILAN-
THROPIC COMMUNITY: OBEDIENCE TO THE UNENFORCEABLE 1-4 (1991) (suggesting philan-
thropic organizations hold themselves to an ethical standard above what is required by law);
JOHN G. SIMON ET AL., THE ETHICAL INVESTOR: UNIVERSITIES AND CORPORATE RESPON-
SIBILITY 157-60 (1972) (focusing on student demand for a greater degree of social responsibil-
ity in university investments).
53. Compare San Francisco Examiner columnist Cyra McFadden's reference to the San
Francisco Foundation's management of the Buck Trust as "a classic case of foxes in charge of
the hen house." Cyra McFadden, Bucking a Will, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 2, 1986, at El, quoted
in Laird, supra note 6, at 986.
54. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980)
[hereinafter Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise] (defining the nondistribution constraint as the
prohibition against distributing a nonprofit's net earnings, if any, to individuals exercising con-
trol over it, such as members, officers, or trustees).
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In addition to protecting their organization's access to future dona-
tions, trustees have other reasons for not exercising too cavalierly a legal
power to depart from donor-imposed restrictions. For one thing, an or-
ganization's reputation for fair play and even-handedness may be an im-
portant element of its appeal to those who are not donors.55 Thus, for
example, in interpreting the terms of their Deed of Gift that deal with
qualification of challengers and conditions of competition, the sponsors
of the America's Cup race may have sufficient incentive to preserve a
sense of fair and open competition that judicial oversight is unneces-
sary.56 To shift sports, who wants to play ball with those who cheat on
the line calls?
Trustees, moreover, have to consider not only their organizations'
reputations, but also their own. As Jonathan Macey points out,
"[i]ndividuals develop reputational capital not only as experts in particu-
lar specialties (such as economists and lawyers), but also for general per-
sonal qualities such as honesty and scrupulousness. ' 57 This, in turn,
creates strong, though extralegal, constraints on the behavior of charita-
ble trustees:
[W]here a trust specifies that it is to be used for some general purpose
such as the funding of scientific research or the elimination of poverty,
there is in place a community of scientists and social workers with very
clearly defined ideas and expectations regarding the appropriate
bounds of proper conduct. Thus... there is an (admittedly loose) set
of standards for judging the performance of the trustees of such trusts.
This set of standards, which might be called community stan-
dards, is bolstered by the fact that trustees who stray markedly from
adherence to such standards are likely to face precipitous drops in the
value of their own reputations within the relevant communities. This
fear of loss of reputational capital is particularly acute where, as gener-
ally occurs, the trustees are drawn from the communities directly af-
fected by the trust. Thus by choosing trustees whose personal
reputation is at stake, [donors] can obtain some assurance that the
trusts they create for the provision of public goods will be administered
faithfully. 58
The effectiveness of this inclination to preserve reputational capital
is nicely illustrated by an aspect of recent cy pres litigation in the Penn-
sylvania state courts involving the Barnes Foundation.59 The founda-
55. Cf Charny, supra note 42, at 388 (stating that the market may effectively sanction
employers who treat employees unfairly but within the limits of the law).
56. See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 2, at 563-65.
57. Macey, supra note 7, at 320.
58. Id.
59. The following account is based on Marie C. Malaro, Deaccessioning in Hard Times,
in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 25, 37 (1992);
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tion, created in 1922 by the patent medicine manufacturer and art
aficionado Albert C. Barnes, owns an art collection particularly notable
for its modem French paintings. In 1991, faced with what it saw as
otherwise insuperable maintenance problems, the foundation's manage-
ment filed a cy pres petition seeking, among other things, permission to
sell part of the collection and to use the proceeds for upgrading the foun-
dation's facilities. Outcry in the museum community was swift and vo-
ciferous, based on the generally accepted principle of museum
management that the proceeds of sales of artworks in collections should
only be used to acquire additional or superior pieces. This principle, like
many principles of museum management embodied in codifications of
the museum community, is stricter than the legally enforceable standards
applicable to museum directors as fiduciaries.60 Yet, faced with their
peers' extralegal pressure to comply, the Barnes Foundation trustees re-
sponded as Macey's theory of reputational capital would suggest. Within
a matter of months, they withdrew the request for permission to sell part
of the collection. 61
Placing the reputation of the organization or its trustees at risk is a
special case of what Anthony Kronman calls "hands tying."'62 In hands
tying, the parties to a nonsimultaneous transaction "make a promise [to
perform] more credible by putting it out of the promisor's power to
breach without incurring costs he could otherwise have avoided. ' 63 In
accepting a charitable contribution with restrictions on its use, the donee
organization and its trustees are, in Kronman's words, "giv[ing their]
reputation in the community as security for [their] promise to per-
Museums as Trustees: To Market, to Market, THE ECONOMIST, June 1, 1991, at 89; Carol
Vogel, A Controversial Man in an Eccentric Place, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, § 2, at 1, 34
(recounting tenure of Richard H. Glanton, president of the Barnes Foundation since 1990);
Where There's a Will, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1992, at 77-78.
For more about Dr. Barnes and his foundation, see GILBERT M. CANTOR, THE BARNES
FOUNDATION: REALITY VS. MYTH (2d ed. 1974); HOWARD GREENFELD, THE DEVIL AND
DR. BARNES: PORTRAIT OF AN AMERICAN ART COLLECTOR (1987); HENRY HART, AN AP-
PRECIATION: DR. BARNES OF MERION (1963); JOHN LuKAcS, PHILADELPHIA: PATRICIANS
& PHILISTINES 1900-1950, at 259-309 (1981).
60. See Malaro, supra note 59, at 27-28.
61. The court ultimately granted the foundation's request to deviate from the trust's
terms to permit a one-time tour of some of the Barnes Foundation's French paintings to the
National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., the Musee d'Orsay in Paris, the Museum of
Western Art in Tokyo, and the Philadelphia Museum of Art, with the proceeds to be used for
repairs and renovation. In re Barnes Foundation, No. 58,788, slip op. at 17-18 (Pa. Ct. C.P.,
Orphans' Ct. Div. July 21, 1992). For the elusive distinction between the doctrine of deviation
from the administrative provisions of a trust, which a court purported to apply in the Barnes
Foundation case, and the cy pres doctrine, see supra note 2.
62. Kronman, supra note 42, at 18-20.
63. Id. at 18.
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form." 64 In the context of charitable gifts the promise is to honor ex-
press, though legally unenforceable, donor directions. The cost of
breach to the trustee is the loss of the trustee's reputation for professional
integrity or the loss of the organization's ability to attract future contrib-
utors. In both cases, breach tends to preclude "opportunities for other
favorable exchanges in the future. '65
It might be objected here that, although individual charities and
their trustees have an incentive to protect their individual reputations,
the example of a few unscrupulous violators of donor intent might never-
theless harm the public perception of the charitable sector as a whole.
No matter how much individual charities polish their reputations in this
regard, a few bad apples will spoil the barrel. Thus, the argument would
run, legal enforcement of donors' wishes needs to be preserved. In evalu-
ating this objection, much depends on what economists might call the
elasticity of supply of charitable giving. If donors are strongly inclined to
charitable giving, they might not diminish their gifts when faced with the
example of unscrupulous charities. Instead they might take steps to en-
sure that the apples of their charitable eyes do not go bad, using the
extralegal enforcement pressures suggested above.66
If moral force and the other extralegal enforcement mechanisms
previously described would in fact ensure that donors' wishes are heeded,
then has my argument proved too much? If donors' wishes will invaria-
bly be obeyed without legal enforcement, removal of legal recourse
would not only do no harm; it would also do no good. Removal, in that
case, would fail to inject any additional flexibility. 67
The answer to that fear is twofold. First, we recognize that, as a
matter of ordinary morality, 68 commitments may sometimes properly be
64. Id. at 18-19.
65. Id. at 18.
66. Hansmann makes a similar point in discussing the possibility that removal of the
federal tax exemption of charitable organizations would result in increased gifts made in an
effort to offset the revenues charities would lose to taxes. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for
Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 65-66
(1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Exempting Nonprofit Organizations].
67. See HOBHOUSE, supra note 24, at 238 (arguing that trustees' inertia makes them an
unlikely source of reform for charitable trusts); POSNER, supra note 33, at 511 (arguing that
trustees of perpetual charitable gifts, unlike outright owners, lack the economic incentives to
manage assets efficiently).
68. It is important to be clear here on precisely what claims I am making for ordinary
morality. I do not mean to suggest that such precepts of ordinary morality as honoring com-
mitments and keeping promises have any foundation other than the common assent of those
who acknowledge them, or that such precepts have any binding force beyond the class of
people who acknowledge them. I have no answer to anyone who rejects those precepts on the
ground that they are based only on social convention, and are thus not binding on those who
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broken. Second, informal enforcement of commitments, relying as it
often does on moral force, is likely to be weakest with respect to precisely
those commitments that have lost their moral force.
Several circumstances in which commitments are generally thought
to be weak as a matter of ordinary morality are.relevant in this context.
For one thing, actively sought commitments are more compelling mor-
ally than those only implicitly assumed. Thus, we -would think more
harshly of an organization that breached'a condition for which the donor
actively bargained-"I will leave you the bulk of my estate, but only if
you use it to build a gym"-than an organization that learned -of the gift
and the condition only after the testator's death. Even if accepting the
latter gift is seen as an implicit acceptance of its terms, the commitment
is intuitively weaker. The obligation to honor the commitment seems
even less firm if there is evidence that the donor was mistaken in his or
her assessment of the worthiness of the designated purpose.69
Dishonoring donor directions, moreover, is likely to be less morally
troubling in the case of the dead than the living. For one thing, the living
can be talked to, reasoned with, confronted with new facts, and thus
brought around to changing their minds. For another, the dead may not
be as constrained as the living in the social utility of their property dispo-
sitions. While the owner of property is alive, the opportunity cost of
foregone personal consumption operates as a significant deterrent to
truly pointless eccentricity in charitable giving and other dispositions of
property. The dead are under no such constraints, and thus their more
eccentric requests are less deserving of respect.70 It is hard, for example,
to fault Kafka's friend and executor for disobeying Kafka's testamentary
instructions to destroy nearly all of his manuscripts. 71 This intuition is
embodied in the law itself. The owner of an art collection may legally
choose to disregard such conventions. Indeed, I argue at some length elsewhere that efforts to
place ordinary morality or any moral system on a firmer foundation than the assent of its
adherents are deeply misguided. Atkinson, New Role Morality, supra note 40, at 977-79. The
following moral analyses (or casuistries, in the narrow, nonpejorative sense), then, are directed
to the community of those who, even if only implicitly, adopt conventional views about the
sanctity of commitments.
69. See, eg., Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843, 847-48 (N.J. 1949) (applying the doctrine of
cy pres to modify a trust for the publication of the testators "Random Scientific Notes" (in
which the court found no scientific merit) to allow Princeton University to use the bequest for
scientific and philosophical research).
70. In the words of Hobhouse: "Nor need the gift involve the slightest sacrifice on the
part of the giver: for all who give by will give simply what they can no longer keep; they give
out of the pockets of their successors, and not out of their own." HOmHOUSE, supra note 24, at
221.
71. See FREDERICK R. KARL, FRANz KAFKA: REPRESENTATIVE MAN 39, 115 (1991).
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destroy it during life, but a personal representative is not legally bound to
execute a testamentary direction to the same effect. 72
The moral force of commitments may also diminish over time. This
is attributable, at least in part, to our shared sense that the nearer a wish
is to fulfillment, the dearer it becomes. 73 This insight underlies the econ-
omists' practice of discounting to present value,74 and something of this
principle probably reinforces the rule against perpetuities. Beyond a
point, the value to a donor (charitable or otherwise) of controlling the
future probably diminishes to the verge of vanishing. Therefore, sug-
gesting that the wishes of long-dead donors carry declining moral force,
particularly since those wishes are likely to be growing more onerous (or
at best less beneficial) to the living, should not strain our ordinary moral
intuitions too much.75 Indeed, at times we will come to see them as in-
72. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Scott (In re Scott's Will), 93 N.W. 109, 109 (Minn.
1903); McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 8, at 154. The law's acceptance of this intuition has the
imprimatur of economic analysis, or at least the imprimatur of one of law's leading economic
analysts. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 33, at 512 (indicating approval of the
Scott result). But cf Ellen R. Porges, Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J.
121, 143 (1981) (urging legal protection of art in the hands of the living).
73. To be sure, some people have a peculiar fascination with, and derive enjoyment from
the prospect of, influencing the very distant future. This is evident, for example, in the case of
time capsules. Their purpose is frustrated if they are opened before the appointed day, a day
valued for its seductively distant remove from the present. Something similar, perhaps, is true
of the directions "Do not open until Christmas." But these examples are, I would suggest, the
exceptions that prove the nearer-and-dearer rule, a conclusion supported by comparing the
popularity of holiday gifts to that of time capsules (which have longer fuses). For a theoretical
account of this phenomenon, see George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of
Delayed Consumption, 97 EcON. J. 666 (1987).
An analogy that is perhaps more apt, and less readily dismissed, is the deep yearning of
some artists, particularly writers, for distant fame. But with the exception of a very few-
Stendhal comes to mind-what most want is probably not deferred but continued fame; fame
that begins now and endures, not fame that springs up later and is on that very account more
dear. And in the case of Stendhal, at least, the desire of distant fame may have been a value
borne of necessity; at the time he wrote of its appeal, it must have seemed the only fame he was
likely to enjoy. See STENDHAL (HENRI BEYLE), THE LIFE OF HENRY BRULARD (Jean Stew-
art and B.C.J.G. Knight trans., The Noonday Press 1958) (1836) (autobiography in which
Stendhal repeatedly addressed the reader of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and accurately predicted that his works would be read and understood not by his contempo-
raries, but by a future audience). See also JEAN DUTOURD, THE MAN OF SENSIBILITY 75
(Robin Chancellor trans., 1961); MARCEL GUTWIRTH, STENDHAL 112 (1971); JOANNA RICH-
ARDSON, STENDHAL 292 (1974); Isabelle Naginski, Stendhal-A Writer for Today, in THE
STENDHAL BICENTENNIAL PAPERS 1 (Avriel H. Goldberger ed., 1987).
74. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 271-72
(14th ed. 1992) (explaining the process of converting future income into an equivalent present
value).
75. Hirsch and Wang observed:
[U]se restrictions (of all sorts) are apt to grow marginally more costly with the pas-
sage of time, as the state of the world diverges from the testator's expectations. Si-
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herently bad. The racially restrictive covenants on land at issue in Shel-
ley v. Kraemer,76 it is worth bearing in mind, have their analogues in the
field of charity.77
The fact that ordinary morality recognizes situations in which com-
mitments may be broken bears on all three objections to eliminating legal
enforcement of donor-imposed restrictions on charitable gifts. Most ob-
viously, morally justified departures from donors' wishes should count as
exceptions to any notion that breaching commitments is inherently
wrong. Beyond that, the more potential donors realize that a decision to
depart from past donors' conditions was morally justified rather than ar-
bitrary or overreaching, the less they will be deterred from either giving
to charity or accumulating wealth. 78 This is not to suggest, however,
that potential donors will not be deterred to some extent, particularly in
their charitable giving.79 To see whether that predictable cost is worth
bearing,80 Part IV examines the costs of reforming the present system,
multaneously, the marginal benefit to the testator of imposing the restriction should
diminish over time, dropping off sharply after the first or second generation.
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 40, at 21 (footnote omitted).
76. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
77. See sources cited supra note 20.
78. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1214-18 (1967) (explaining
that the more (or less) property owners' senses of fairness are affronted by a regulation deval-
uing their property, the more (or less) demoralized they will be as prospective investors in
property).
79. Traditional cy pres reformers sometimes cite the history of English charity reform as
evidence that loosening the dead hand's grip will not deter the making of charitable gifts.
They point in particular to the high levels of charitable giving that followed both Henry VIII's
abolition of religious foundations and the mid-nineteenth-century Parliamentary relaxation of
the terms of educational endowments. 4 Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 10, at 536; Simon,
supra note 3, at 662-63 (following Scott); HOBHOUSE, supra note 24, at 226 (citing Tudor
abolition).
Although this argument should support my position as well, it has a critical, if not fatal,
flaw. Exogenous factors like a general economic expansion and consequent increase in private
wealth might have spurred private giving in these periods, offsetting what otherwise might
have been a lag in giving attributable to interference with dead hand control. In other word,
cy pres reformers overlook the very real possibility that a rising economic tide lifted charitable
giving over mudbanks of legal reform that might have deterred donations in drier times.
80. Not all would agree that reduction of gifts subject to dead hand control is to be
reckoned a cost. Hobhouse, after discounting the likelihood that limiting dead hand control
would deter giving, concluded that the alternative was worse:
[P]roperty subject to unalterable trusts is not a blessing but a curse. If the applica-
tion of endowments is to be the same for ever, we should be far better without them
than with them. If a man will not give except on the terms of having his commands
obeyed for ever, then, say I, let him keep his money, and let it perish with him.
HOBHOUSE, supra note 24, at 225.
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and Part V examines the benefits of a system in which the legal enforce-
ment of the dead hand is removed.
C. Summary
Cy pres reformers have been overly pessimistic in their worries
about relaxing the legal enforceability of dead hand restrictions. Appre-
ciating the ready availability of extralegal enforcement mechanisms
should diminish these worries, and cy pres reformers should be willing to
loosen substantially the legal enforcement of dead hand restrictions in
order to advance their goal of more efficient use of resources committed
to charitable purposes. But that opportunity points to the second funda-
mental problem of cy pres reform: giving content to the notion of "chari-
table efficiency."
IV. The Reformers' Overly Optimistic Assumption-The
Possibility of Giving Content to the Charitable
Efficiency Standard
Cy pres reform rests on the assumption that some method can be, or
has been, devised for measuring how much bang is produced by the char-
itable buck, a metric now generally referred to as "charitable effi-
ciency." ' But no one has devised such a metric, and the available
candidates hold little promise. Furthermore, pursuing the goal of re-
formist cy pres without such a metric could result in standardless judicial
modification of charitable trusts, a grim prospect for those who cherish
the diversity and independence of the nonprofit sector. Thus, it is impor-
tant to examine the possible foundations on which a standard of effi-
81. The term "charitable efficiency" is more commonly used by commentators than by
courts. Courts have, however, followed reformist commentators' suggestion to move away
from the traditional "impossibility" or "illegality" as the level of frustration required to trigger
the application of cy pres. Instead, liberalizing courts now tend to require only "inexpediency"
or "impracticability." Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 10, § 399.4. With these terms courts
try to capture the idea that modification of a trust's purpose may be appropriate when the costs
of enforcing the donor's intent become excessive relative to the benefits. Statements of the
liberalizing approach, however, have a Scylla-or-Charybdis quality about them:
The line between impossibility, impracticability, and inexpediency on the one side,
and inconvenience or slight undesirability on the other, may be difficult to draw, but
it may constitute the boundary between the use of cy pres and the refusal to apply
that doctrine .... [Tihe court will not substitute a new scheme merely because the
trustee or the court believes it would be a better plan than that which the settlor
provided.... [But] greatly diminished usefulness of the charity due to changed con-
ditions has been considered by some courts as justifying the use of the doctrine ....
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at 171-73 (citations omitted). The obvious question, ob-
scured by the conclusory terms "inexpedient," "impracticable," and "inefficient," is how
courts are to know when the burden of enforcing a restriction exceeds its benefit.
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ciency might be established and the dangers of standardless judicial
modification.
A. The Shaky Foundations of the Efficiency Standard
The very word "efficiency" suggests a utilitarian calculus, as does its
scholarly application in the context of cy pres. 2 But this calculus is noto-
riously difficult to apply, even if it is accepted as appropriate in princi-
ple.8 3 Are the pleasures.of animals, and perhaps plants, to count?84 Are
all human pleasures to count equally, or are some higher or lower than
others?85 Is it right to sacrifice an innocent (and unwilling) individual to
save a multitude?8 6
Economic analysis has tried to overcome these problems of utilitari-
anism,87 and it is tempting to think that the efficiency of which cy pres
reformers speak might be usefully equated with the technical economic
concept of efficiency. As a matter of fact, it does not seem that this is
82. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 33, at 508-10; SIMEs, supra note 6;
Fisch, Changing Concepts, supra note 6, at 393; Kenneth L. Kast, The Efficiency of the Chari-
table Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. REv. 433, 468-76 (1960); Sisson,
supra note 3, at 648-53.
83. For a concise account of the faults of utilitarianism, see Richard A. Posner, Utilitari-
anism, Economies, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 111-79 (1979J [hereinafter Pos-
ner, Utilitarianism]. For contemporary debate on the merits of utilitarianism, see J.C.C.
SMART ET AL., UTILTARANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973); UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND
(A. Sen & B. Williams eds., 1982).
84. Compare Singer's detailed argument that they should, PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIB-
ERATION (1977) (especially chapter 1), with Posner's biting observation that "[a] philosophy
that does not distinguish sharply between people and sheep should be congenial to people with
collectivist or interventionist sympathies," Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 83, at 115 n.46.
85. Mill's answer was clear: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." JOHN STUART MILL, UTILI-
TARIANISM 14 (Oskar Piest ed., The Library of Liberal Arts 1957) (1861). Whether his justifi-
cation for the distinction rests on utilitarian premises is, however, another matter: "And if the
fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the
question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." Id
86. See FYODOR DosToEvsmu, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 226 (Manuel Komroff ed.
& Constance Garnett trans., The New American Library 1957) (1879-80):
Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making
men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last. Imagine that you are doing
this but that it is essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature-
that child beating its breast with its fist, for instance-in order to found that edifice
on its unavenged tears. Would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?
Tell me. Tell the truth.
87. Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 83. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF JUSTICE 60-87 (1981) (distinguishing economic analysis from utilitarianism as a norma-
tive system).
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what reformers have had in mind.88 Nor is it likely that the economic
concept would work well for the reformers.
To see why not, we must first be clear about what economists mean
by efficiency. Economic analysis reduces the practical problems of clas-
sic utilitarianism with a radically simplifying assumption: How much
people value something is to be measured by how much they are both
willing and able to pay for it, rather than, in classic utilitarian terms, by
how much pleasure it brings them.89 A transaction is socially optimal, or
efficient, if it brings resources into the hands of those who value them
most, in the stipulated sense of being willing and able to pay most for
them.
An example will illustrate why this notion of efficiency will not work
well as a standard for cy pres reform:
Suppose that pituitary extract is in very scarce supply relative to
the demand and is therefore very expensive. A poor family has a child
who will be a dwarf if he does not get some of the extract, but the
family cannot afford the price.... A rich family has a child who will
grow to normal height, but the extract will add a few inches more, and
his parents decide to buy it for him. In the sense of value used in this
book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich than to the poor
family, because value is measured by willingness to pay; but the extract
would confer greater happiness in the hands of the poor family than in
the hands of the rich one.90
To make the conclusion indelicately explicit, purchase by the wealthy
family is more efficient, and thus, in the eyes of economic analysis, the
proper outcome.
Richard Posner, author of the example, uses it to illustrate the limi-
tations of economic efficiency as an ethical criterion, though he insists
that the limitations are "perhaps not serious ones, as such examples are
very rare." 91 Even if he is right about the relative rarity of such examples
in the economy as a whole, they certainly bulk larger in the realm of
charity, where the problem of allocating vital but scarce resources like
88. The cy pres reformers' notion of "efficiency" antedates the advent of economic analy-
sis of law. Compare the January 1960 publication date of Professor Karst's article, Karst,
supra note 82, with Posner's observation that "economics had no real impact on legal theory
(save in a few fields like antitrust law where the legal norm was explicitly economic) until the
1960s," Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 83, at 105-06.
89. Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 83, at 119 (defining his notion of value), 127-35
(testing his notion of value against the standard objections to utilitarianism). For two less
sanguine assessments of this substitution of wealth for happiness, see Dworkin, supra note 38,
especially Part VII, and Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 456-59 (1974).
90. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 33, at 13.
91. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
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health care, food, and shelter among the needy is all too common. In-
deed, in the world of charity, Posner's exceptional case is more likely to
be the rule.
The problem is that, in order to avoid the complexities of classical
utilitarianism, economic analysis takes the existing distribution of wealth
in society as a given, without questioning the equity of that distribu-
tion.92 This assumption, though perhaps harmless enough in many con-
texts, runs counter to the traditional role of much of the charitable
sector, which is to rectify perceived maldistributions of wealth or amelio-
rate their consequences. Thus, it would strain no one's conception of
charity for a hospitat charged with allocating Posner's pituitary extract
to award it to the poor child rather than to the rich child, contrary to the
dictates of economic efficiency.93
Another approach to defining efficiency would be to import a New
Deal or Progressive Era notion of public good, which played a prominent
role in the writings of the legal realists and is at least implicit in the
writings of those cy pres reformers who took their cue from these move-
ments.94 This would seem quite compatible with (if not derivable from)
the notion, deeply imbedded in the general law of charity, that charity's
essential function is to provide public benefits.95
There are, however, serious problems with this approach. Most fun-
damentally, the "New Dealish" notion of a monolithic public good iden-
92. See Leff, supra note 89, at 478-81.
93. Economic analysis does offer the prospect of an efficient redistribution of wealth. For
an unpacking of this counterintuitive concept, which bases the optimal level of wealth redistri-
bution on the amount of redistribution that the wealthy are willing and able to pay for, see Rob
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 501, 521 n.69 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Atkinson, Altruism].
94. See, ag., Chester, supra note 6, at 414-16, 425 (noting the influence of Pound and the
Realists on reformist cy pres); Edith L. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philoso-
phies, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 375, 384 (1953) ("The transition from stress on the dead hand to
interest in public benefit is in accord with Pound's legal philosophy."); Comment, supra note
28, at 322-23 (arguing that courts applying cy pres should expressly state that "the element of
public welfare" was among the factors used, particularly when "reaching results which obvi-
ously show the impact of social considerations"). Pound's relationship with Legal Realism, of
course, was anything but uncomplicated. Compare Roscoe Pound, Call for a Realist Jurispru-
dence, 44 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1931) (qualifiedly praising the Realist movement) with Karl
Llewelyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222
(1931) (responding to Pound's alleged distortions of the Realist movement). For a summary of
the Progressive approach to public policy, see SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA, THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1992).
95. For criticism of this theory of charity in its traditional form, see Atkinson, Altruism,
supra note 93, at 605-09; Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Non-
profit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 364-85
(1991); and Hansmann, supra note 66, at 66-74.
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tifiable by experts is in serious disfavor. 96 As applied to the law of
charity, it has been attacked as at best question-begging, and at worst a
cloak for unlimited judicial discretion. The notion of public benefit could
be narrowed, in the context of charitable organizations, to cover only
those activities that reduce the burdens of government. This has occa-
sionally been suggested, but is generally disfavored, 97 for two primary
reasons: It would apply rather awkwardly to the case of religious organi-
zations,98 and it would undermine the pluralism and diversity that are
taken to be essential features of the charitable sector.99
Moreover, even if criticisms of the traditional public benefit theory
of charity are answerable, there is a further problem with trying to derive
from that theory an intelligible concept of charitable efficiency. The
traditional public benefit theory is designed to assess whether the overall
purpose of an organization is charitable. It is an absolute test, which
focuses primarily on purpose rather than performance. To give content
to their notion of efficiency, however, cy pres reformers need a measure
of relative performance by organizations serving admittedly charitable
purposes.
A comparison with the "pure" cy pres model l°° will clarify this
point. Recall that the frustration component of that analysis is an abso-
lute test; the threshold inquiry is whether the original charitable purpose
is totally and absolutely precluded. Were it possible to come up with a
viable public benefit theory of charity, the pure cy pres model would
nicely complement it. Only when the donor's purpose becomes either
uncharitable or impossible to fulfill would the courts be permitted to step
in with corrections, albeit only very minor ones.
By contrast, cy pres reformers want the courts to be able to step in
not only when the charitable purpose has failed utterly, but also when it
is not going sufficiently well, and with modifications that are not neces-
96. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR
How THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SUL-
FUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 1-12 (1981); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republicanism Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REv.
1511, 1520 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1683 (1975).
97. Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590-91 (1983) (majority
opinion) (verging on this approach) with id. (Powell, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority
for taking that position). See also Hall & Colombo, supra note 95, at 345-63 (rejecting this
approach as an explanation for granting tax exemptions to nonprofit hospitals).
98. See Harvey P. Dale, Rationales for Tax Exemption 4 (Feb. 1, 1988) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
99. See Atkinson, Altruism, supra note 93, at 605 n.291 (collecting authorities).
100. See supra Part II.A.
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sadly minimal. For that they need a measure of "well" which, unlike the
standard of failure, cannot be directly derived from the notion of public
benefit. The public benefit theory claims to give all that "pure" cy pres
would require, a definition of "doing good." What the reformed cy pres"
theory needs, and what the public benefit theory of charity does not pur-
port to give, is a measure of "doing well at doing good." 101
B. The Dangers of Muddling Through
There are several possible ways to apply the doctrine of cy pres in
the absence of a clearly articulated standard of charitable efficiency, none
of which is particularly satisfactory.
The first possibility would be to let the courts decide, making this an
equitable call in the classic sense, with the attendant risk that the stan-
dard will vary with the chancellor's foot. 10 2 This may be the tack cy pres
is now taking, if the resolution of the Buck Trust'0 3 litigation is any indi-
cation. There the supervisory court did not merely reject the trustee's cy
pres petition requesting an expansion of the geographic scope of the trust
to include the San Francisco Bay area. It took matters into its own
hands, mandating that a substantial share of the trust's income be de-
voted to "major... projects... located in Matin County, the benefits
101. For the source of this phrase, and more on the problem it describes, see Rosabeth
Moss Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well While Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance
Measurement in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency Approach,
in THE NoNpRoFrr SECrOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 154 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
There is a further problem for those willing to indulge my altruism theory of charity,
briefly set out in the Appendix, as an alternative to the narrower traditional theory. Even if a
viable notion of "doing good well" could be derived from the public benefit theory of charity,
that would hardly be cause for celebration. Just as the purpose of charity is set by public
standards in the orthodox theory of charity, so in its cy pres equivalent would the acceptable
level of performance be assessed by public standards. On the one hand the public would define
what the public good is; on the other, the public would define how well the public good must
be performed. Consistent with my broader vision of charity, I would rather see both stan-
dards, the definition of what the public good is and the appropriate measure of how well it is
being served, set by nonprofit organizations themselves, subject only to the outer limit of the
nondistribution constraint that defines the frontier of the nonprofit sector. For an elaboration
of that perspective in the theory of cy pres, see infra Part V.
102. The government official who exercises this power has traditionally been the chancel-
lor, but there is no reason it could not be located elsewhere. Thus, for example, in England
much of the chancellor's traditional cy pres power has been placed by statute in an administra-
tive body, the Charity Commissioners. See supra note 5. Wherever the power is located, how-
ever, the problem addressed in the text will remain: How can the exercise of this power be
subjected to principled limits?
103. In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1986).
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from which will inure not only to Main County but [also to] all of hu-
mankind." 104 As John Simon saw the matter:
The result allows an agency of the state to become the grant-making
supervisor, thus undermining the decentralized, or "privatized," struc-
ture so carefully nurtured in our legal order.
... The superior court has removed from the Buck Trust manage-
ment and reserved to itself the right to decide how a major part of
Beryl Buck's legacy will be used to help the nation or the world....
Philanthropy has "gone public" with a vengeance105
Nor is "going public" the worst of it. The trial court "rejected the trust-
ees' assessment of efficiency," and in its place "substituted its own phil-
anthropic preferences." 10 6 Cy pres has not only gone statist; it seems to
be going standardless as well. 107
The second possibility would be a "know it when we see it" stan-
dard based on the judge's assessment of public sentiment as to charitable
performance, rather than the judge's personal preferences on that score.
This judicially administered, populist cy pres would add little practical
limit to judges' discretion, and would introduce another evil. Its very
populism runs counter to the notion that charities are to be laboratories
of countermajoritarian experimentation in social betterment.
The third possibility, a compromise measure, might be called con-
servative reformed cy pres. This possibility implicitly takes account of
the evils of unrestrained judicial and populist cy pres. Simes seems to
have taken this position, arguing that charities should be reformable as
104. Simon, supra note 3, at 665 (quoting the court's Order No. 23259 (July 31, 1986, Cal.
Super. Ct., Matin Co.)).
105. Id. at 660-61.
106. Id. at 660. Cf Robert W. Gettleman & David R. Hodgman, Judicial Construction of
Charitable Bequests: Theory vs. Practice, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1977) (generally ap-
plauding liberalization of cy pres, but expressing fear that it may work in favor of large and
established charities at the expense of small and novel ones).
107. See Schrag, supra note 3, at 583 ("As the intent of the settlor becomes less determina-
tive of the trust's uses, the bias of the trustee or of the state becomes more controlling.").
In commenting on the version of this paper presented to the New York Nonprofit Forum
on April 16, 1992, Marion Fremont-Smith and Daniel Kurtz objected that the Buck Trust case
is anomalous, both in the extent to which the court and state attorney general were at odds and
the extent to which the court indulged its own substantive preferences as to the use of trust
assets. Both are well versed in the typical role of attorneys general in initiating the application
of cy pres; Fremont-Smith wrote the now-classic account of charitable regulation, MARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW SUPER-
VISION (1965), and she and Kurtz headed, respectively, the branches of the Massachusetts and
the New York Attorney General's offices in charge of overseeing charities. But even though,
as they quite rightly point out, attorneys general typically play a larger and more donor-defer-
ential role than the courts, that only presses us back to the other side of the problem, the
lamentable tendency of attorneys general to seek the application of cy pres only in truly egre-
gious cases of waste.
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"inexpedient" whenever "the amount to be expended is out of all propor-
tion to its value to society."108 "Out of all proportion" seems aimed at
restricting courts to dealing only with waste that is truly egregious,
judged by a standard on which no reasonable people would disagree.
The problem with this "inexpediency," lowest-common-denomina-
tor standard is that it concedes a very large amount of arguable waste to
the dead hand. This amount is less than that allowed by pure cy pres,
with its threshold of impossibility, but much more than reformed cy pres
would have to concede if it could formulate a clear standard of efficiency
to rein in judicial discretion. Conservative reformed cy pres makes an
awkward alliance with the dead hand, the very force cy pres reform
promised to combat, in an effort to protect the diversity and indepen-
dence of the charitable sector from judicial excess. Thus, for example, in
responding to the charge that charitable efficiency under an intuitively
utilitarian standard would suggest serving the needs of starving Ethiopi-
ans and East Indians before relatively well off indigents in the San Fran-
cisco Bay area, John Simon invoked the orthodoxy of deference to the
dead hand: Cy pres modification should leave a trust as close as possible
to the donor's original intent.109
There is, finally, a fourth response to the lack of an objective crite-
rion of efficiency, the response this Article recommends. This suggestion
neither cedes unlimited discretion to supervisory courts nor defers un-
duly to the dead hand. It instead suggests that reformers look for gui-
dance to charitable trustees. This approach has been discussed to a
promising but as yet limited extent,110 suggesting that, the opinion of
108. SIms, supra note 6, at 139. "Inexpediency" is Professor Simes's equivalent of con-
temporary reformers' "inefficiency."
109. Simon, supra note 3, at 664.
110. Id. at 658-61.
Scott envisioned the trustees as having both an advisory role and a veto power over liber-
alized cy pres:
I would contend.., that even if the precise purposes for which the property was
given are not actually impossible of accomplishment, even if changes are not impera-
tively demanded, yet if the trustees consent to certain changes, and the court is of the
opinion that such changes are not unreasonable in view of the general purposes of the
donors and of the changes time has brought to pass, in view, in short, of all the
circumstances, the court should authorize such changes. I contend, in other words,
that the consent of the trustees is a most important factor in determining what
changes are justifiable. The trustees are peculiarly fit to determine such questions.
They hold and administer the property; they and they alone represent both the do-
nors and the beneficiaries.
Austin Wakeman Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, 34 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17 (1920) (foot-
notes omitted). See also DiClerico, supra note 2, at 179, 197 (adopting Scott's position).
The power I am recommending should not be confused with the present power reserved
to community foundations by their own charters to alter the terms of funds entrusted to them
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trustees deserves deference, but on only two fairly narrow grounds.
Sometimes trustees are said to be in a position to know what the donor
would have wanted in the event of unforeseen circumstances short of
impossibility."'1 Alternatively, they are said to be particularly expert in
determining whether charities of the kind they serve are performing up
to an objectively verifiable standard of efficiency. On the first view, the
trustees are proxies for donor intent; on the second, for societal standards
of charitable efficiency. Although this focus on trustees so far has been
derivative and by default, it holds promise for a deference to trustees that
is radically direct. That is the possibility explored by the remainder of
this Article.1 12
V. Reforming Cy Pres Reform-The Sectarian Alternative 13
Traditional cy pres reform has reached an impasse. Deference to
dead hand control and the absence of a clear standard of charitable effi-
ciency hem cy pres reformers in on two sides. On the one side, deference
to the dead hand requires reformers to limit the scope of their reform to
intent-honoring changes, even if those changes leave charitable assets in
uses no living person sees as socially optimal. But if reformers ignore (or
stretch) donor intent to permit socially optimal changes, they run into a
problem on the other side: the absence of a clear standard of efficiency to
guide judicial trust reform concedes excessive discretion to the courts.
Conferring standardless reform power on the courts, as instrumentalities
without having to seek court approval under the cy pres doctrine. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 10, § 329, at 465-66, 467; Norman A. Sugarman, Community Foundations, in 3 RE-
SEARCH PAPERS: SPECIAL BEHAVIORAL STUDIES, FOUNDATIONS, AND CORPORATIONS
1689, 1693 (1977). For one thing, the reserved power of community foundations must be
triggered by a frustration of donor intent, and is thus not nearly as expansive as the power I
would give charitable trustees. More fundamentally, donors in effect elect to subject their gifts
to the amending power of community foundations in their very decision to make gifts to orga-
nizations with such a power explicitly spelled out in their charters. By contrast, the power I
recommend would inhere, by operation of law, in all donee organizations.
111. See Scott, supra note 110, at 17; Simon, supra note 3, at 658-61.
112. Scott considered this position and rejected it out of hand: "I would not contend that
absolute power should be given to the trustees to divert charity funds to any charitable purpose
they may select." Scott, supra note 110, at 17.
This approach is adumbrated, but never made wholly explicit, in Simon, supra note 3, at
658-60. Nothing that Simon says there indicates that he has yet despaired of giving content to
the reformist notion of charitable efficiency, or that he would grant as much discretion to
trustees as I suggest in the next section. The contrary position is quite clear in his writing, id.,
and he has reaffirmed it to me in conversation. But that suggestion is entirely consistent with
his general description, id., of the third sector's mediating position between the purely private
and the purely public.
113. For my reasons for choosing this term, see infra text accompanying note 122.
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of the state, jeopardizes the much-vaunted independence of the third
sector.
A. Transcending the Old Dilemmas
The focus on trustees, sharpened by Simon, offers a way between the
horns of this dilemma. As we have seen, Simon's outlook is constrained
by what he describes as "the binary," private versus public perspective,
which views trustees as merely proxies for donor intent or publicly deter-
mined social good. 114 But it is quite easy to transcend the dilemma by
viewing trustees as an independent, third locus of control.
On the one hand, this approach would directly and immediately
eliminate the primary problem of dead hand control-the need to deal
with changed circumstances-by placing ultimate decisions about chang-
ing the use of charitable assets in the hands of living trustees. Full legal
title to property in charitable trusts could be given to trustees, in a new,
but still fiduciary, capacity. Trustees would be legally empowered to use
the assets committed to their management in whatever way they deter-
mined would most advance the public good, limited by what the state
defines as charitable through common law, legislation, or administrative
regulation, as well as by extralegal mechanisms to enforce donor
intent. 115
On the other hand, this approach would avert the primary problem
of judicial control-the absence of an objective definition of charitable
efficiency. For one thing, trustees would not need such a definition to
guide their actions. They could make their own judgments as to effi-
ciency based on the donors' wishes; on universal, societal standards; or
on their own standards, limited, to the extent they themselves deem fit,
by deference to the expressed wishes of donors. Nor would trustees need
an objective definition as protection from judicial overreaching. Since
the trustees would be the ultimate arbiters of charitable efficiency, courts
could not, under an il-defined standard, impose their own judgments
arbitrarily.
It bears emphasizing that this approach would not eliminate the reg-
ulatory role of either the state or private donors. The state, for its part,
would continue to perform two critical policing functions. First, the
state would establish and patrol the outer limits of charity, as it tradition-
ally has.1 16 The new freedom of charitable trustees to change the use of
the assets in their hands would still have to operate within whatever the
114. See Simon, supra note 3, at 653-57.
115. See supra Part III.
116. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585-92 (1983) (noting that institu-
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state determined the bounds of charity to be. 1 7 The trustees of a charita-
ble hospital, for example, could decide to devote the assets of their organ-
ization to community health centers,1 18 or even to funding scholarly
research on the cy pres doctrine. But they could not simply settle the
organization's debts, disband, and divide the net assets among them-
selves. To do so would transgress even the widest imaginable parameter
of charitable purposes, the nondistribution constraint itself.1 19 The
state's second policing function would be to continue to set and monitor
standards of fiduciary duty, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The
latter would be particularly important; without constraints on self-deal-
ing, the assets of charities would simply be the private property of
trustees. 120
Nor would donors be left entirely out of the picture. The restric-
tions donors place on their gifts would still carry moral weight. Donors
would, moreover, still have nonlegal means of enforcing their wishes, not
least of which would be the threat, implicit or explicit, of cutting off fu-
ture support.
B. Creating New Opportunities
The suggested approach, the sectarian alternative, will avoid
problems to which reformed cy pres analysis is inherently subject. There
is, however, a more positive way of seeing things. On this view, we
would turn the assets of charity over to trustees, not in default of finding
a way to give greater control to the donor or the state, but as an affirma-
tive choice based on both political and economic grounds.
(1) Political Opportunities
The political argument in favor of the sectarian approach embodies
a perspective on social order that is distinct from the liberal individual-
tions must conform to the common-law notions of charity in order to warrant tax-exempt
status).
117. The bounds of charity could (but need not) be as broad as the nondistribution con-
straint that defines the nonprofit sphere. In other words, any organization that is truly non-
profit could be recognized as charitable. For my proposal that charity be defined almost that
broadly (excluding only mutual benefit organizations), see the Appendix.
118. Compare Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40-41 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977), where this was not allowed.
119. See Hansmann, Exempting Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 66, at 56-57, on the
nondistribution constraint.
120. This is the case under current law. See ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 10, at 315-20
(stating that trustee's duty of care and duty of loyalty cannot be completely eliminated without
destroying the very essence of a trust; property "entrusted" without some such standards is in
effect a gift to the trustee).
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ism underlying "pure" cy pres and from the commmunitarianism underly-
ing most previous efforts at cy pres reform. 121 Unlike the liberal
individualism of the former, sectarianism does not take the preferences of
donors as sacrosanct. Unlike the communitarianism of the latter, sectari-
anism does not seek a definition of charitable efficiency common to all
citizens of the state and therefore administrable by courts as the citizens'
proxy. Instead, sectarianism places primary reliance on charities them-
selves as intermediaries between the individual and the state, bodies that
may entertain quite different visions of charitable efficiency. Control
over the disposition of charitable assets would move from the courts,
which now act as dual custodians of individual donor wishes and com-
munity-wide notions of charitable efficiency, to the charities themselves,
a locus between individual donors and the political community.
I call this intermediate position "sectarian" to highlight qualities
that strike me as essential and desirable in charitable organizations: de-
votion to the public good, rather than the good of themselves or their
members, and commitment to a vision of the public good that is not
shared by all citizens of the state. The term "sectarian," of course, has
negative connotations as well, and I use the term as an implicit warning
against the dangers inherent in sectarian groups: parochialism, exclusiv-
ism, and hegemony. 122 But at their best, such groups embody and inspire
a constrained optimism: optimism, in their active commitment to confer-
ring benefits beyond their membership, yet constrained, in their tacit con-
cession that such commitment is not now shared by society as a whole.
While we await the millennium of universal civic virtue, we would do
well to strengthen these congregations that promote the public good here
and now. One step in that direction would be to give them an added
measure of freedom from donors and the state.123
121. In distinguishing sectarianism from both liberalism and communitarianism, I am fol-
lowing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714, 1719-22
(1988). "Normative pluralism" is her term for what I call the sectarian position; civic republi-
canism is the particular form of communitarianism that Sullivan distinguishes from it. I am
grateful to Miriam Galston for guiding me through these distinctions.
122. See The Donee Group, Private Philanthropy: Vital and Innovative or Passive and Ir-
relevant, in I RESEARCH PAPERS: HISTORY, TRENDS, AND CURRENT MAGNITUDES 49
(1977). For further criticisms of private foundations, see Atkinson, Altruism, supra note 93, at
596-97.
123. The approach I advocate is aggressively sectarian: Every gift to charity either en-
hances an existing sectarian community, in the case of gifts to existing, charitable organiza-
tions, or creates a new one, in the case of new charitable trusts. The opposite approach,
evident in some cases and noted by some commentators, treats every gift to a nonprofit organi-
zation as a trust for the purpose for which the organization was organized and operating at the
time of the gift. Pacific Home v. Los Angeles County, 264 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1953). Under this
approach, for example, a California charity that operated a hospital was forbidden to rent its
July 1993]
There is no way to prove that this sectarian alternative is superior to
the communitarian or individualist solutions, or to compromises between
the two that can be offered within the framework of traditional cy pres
analysis. Indeed, political liberalism in its classic form is hostile to bod-
ies that separate individuals and the state, 124 and preferential treatment
of nonprofits has been attacked on that very ground. 25
On the other hand, enhancing the position of such intermediate bod-
ies comports well with standard defenses of the third, nonprofit sector as
both intermediate between and independent of the private, market sector
and the public, governmental sector. By displacing state-enforced defer-
ence to donors, the sectarian approach further distances the nonprofit
sphere from the two alternative spheres. Moreover, it strengthens the
third sector in three related, but less obvious, ways. First, in denying
state enforcement to donors' wishes, it presses donors to create or en-
hance alternative enforcement systems that are perforce outside the state,
and thus more likely to be within the third sector itself.126 Second, since
under the sectarian approach the donee organization will have the ulti-
mate say regardless of the alternative enforcement mechanism, donors'
dealings with them will probably involve less monologue and more dia-
logue. Finally, after death has removed the donor from the dialogue,
deference to his or her wishes will be dynamic rather than static, permit-
hospital to a for-profit corporation and use the proceeds to finance neighborhood clinics, on
the assumption that its donors had relied on a provision in its charter stating that its primary
purpose was to operate a hospital. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40-
41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). See also Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394
P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964) (holding that minority trustees of osteopathy college, a charitable corpo-
ration, stated a cause of action in seeking to enjoin as a breach of trust the conversion to
teaching of allopathic medicine). For a discussion of the split among courts as to whether to
treat gifts to charitable corporations as gifts in trusts or as absolute gifts, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, § 324, at 379-91, § 363,
at 29-32; Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 10, § 348.1.
124. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1121-24
(1980) (discussing liberal opposition to inherent sovereignty of cities on these grounds).
125. Stephen Diamond, Of Budgets and Benevolence: Philanthropic Tax Exemptions in
Nineteenth Century America, in CONFERENCE: RATIONALES FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX Ex-
EMPTIoN 18-19 (New York University School of Law, Program on Philanthropy and the Law
ed., 1991) (discussing liberal opposition to tax exemption of nonprofit organizations).
126. See Giovan Harbour Venable, Note, Courts Examine Congregationalism, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 719, 748 (1989) (urging Congregationalist churches to "develop negotiation and arbitra-
tion procedures which can effectively deal with church property disputes before resort to the
civil courts becomes unavoidable"). Cf Charny, supra note 42, at 442 ("Far from establishing
a society of trusting individuals, widespread enforcement of informal commitments based on
trust alone would create a dystopia of regulatory oppression.").
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ting organic development of the sectarian community in the place of
dead hand direction.12 7
(2) Economic Opportunities
In addition to these political considerations, an economic factor
weighs in favor of eliminating legally enforced dead hand control. Henry
Hansmann has convincingly argued that nonprofit organizations are
sometimes more efficient suppliers of goods and services than for-profit
firms in the face of what he calls contract failure, the inability of patrons
to monitor output.' 28 In industries characterized by various forms of
contract failure, those who patronize nonprofit suppliers are more likely
to get what they pay for at the offered price. Nonprofits, forbidden by
their very nonprofit status to distribute net profits to equity owners, have
less of an incentive than for-profit firms to increase net revenues by trad-
ing on patrons' inability to monitor output. 129
When demand for their output is rising, however, nonprofits may
not be able to expand at an optimal rate. Their sources of capital are
limited to loans, retained earnings, and contributions. Unlike for-profit
firms, the defining legal characteristic of nonprofit firms-the nondis-
tribution constraint-makes it impossible for them to attract capital in
the form of equity investments.1 30 If trustees were allowed to move as-
127. This relationship between donor and donee organization is analogous to the Roman
Catholic (as opposed to Protestant) relationship between divine revelation and the believing
community. In the Catholic tradition, doctrine is thought of as developing organically within
the church along lines not logically inferable from the original revelation. JOHN HENRY CAR-
DINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 3-54 (1968).
In the Protestant traditions of Luther and particularly of Calvin, the original revelation is the
ultimate source of authority for the community. See, eg., ROLAN H. BAINTON, THE REFOR-
MATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 4-5 (1956).
This analogy was suggested to me by John Simon's observation that "[o]nce the donor is
gone, the trustees serve as the donor's vicar." Simon, supra note 3, at 658. In pursuing Si-
mon's analogy, I do not mean to suggest that the theological and cy.pres questions be an-
swered, as well as asked, in the same way. Suffice it to say that much may turn on the one in
whose stead the vicar is standing.
128. Economic theory tells us that consumers usually know what goods and services they
want to buy, that they are usually able to tell whether-they got what they paid for, and that
competition among for-profit suppliers usually ensures that they paid the lowest possible price.
Hansmann identifies three basic forms of contract failure. Sometimes patrons cannot evaluate
a firm's output because it is not delivered to them, but to unrelated third parties, as in CARE's
overseas relief work. Hansmann, supra note 54, at 846-48. Sometimes patrons' payments are
difficult for them to correlate with increased output because the output is a public good in the
technical economic sense, like listener-sponsored radio. Id at 848-54. And sometimes pa-
trons' payments are hard for them to correlate with output because the output is highly com-
plex, like brain surgery or higher education. Id. at 862-72.
129. Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 54.
130. Hansmann, Exempting Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 66, at 54. Cf Kanter &
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sets from the charitable purposes to which they are presently devoted to
new ones, a significant new source of capital would be available. Within
the field of charity, capital would be free to move where rising consumer
demand suggests it is most needed.131
VI. Problems with the Sectarian Approach
Whether legal enforcement of dead hand control can be removed
without damaging the cause of charity is addressed in Part III; whether it
should be removed to advance that cause is addressed in Part V. Even if
both questions are answered affirmatively, in favor of the sectarian alter-
native to traditional cy pres reform, several subsidiary questions remain.
They are the subject of this Part.
A. Membership or Citizenship First?
Eliminating the legal enforcement of dead hand control raises the
more general issue of the proper scope of state review of the internal
affairs of charitable and other nonprofit organizations. The examples
presented so far tend to minimize this problem because they assume that
the charity is a small organization governed by relatively few trustees,
acting unanimously, or at least without serious discord. These assump-
tions are, unfortunately, somewhat misleading. Charitable organizations
are sometimes large and complex, with multistate operations and a multi-
tude of local affiliates, as in the case of religious denominations1 32 and
federated charities like the United Way. 133 And sometimes, alas, the
Summers, supra note 101, at 154-55 (noting that a nonprofit organization's sense of commit-
ment to a particular charitable mission limits its redirection of resources to new areas; for-
profits, which are guided only by higher rates of return, can more easily redirect their re-
sources). As I argue below, nonprofits could be freed to change their particular mission and
redirect their resources accordingly.
131. It is tempting to suggest another economic reason for giving trustees free rein as to
the use of assets in the charitable sector: the savings in avoiding cy pres litigation. To know
whether there is a net savings here, however, we would have to take several other factors into
account. At the most basic level, we would need to know whether the reduction in litigation
expenses was being more than offset by the costs of other, informal enforcement mechanisms
of the kind discussed in Part III. At a more refined level of analysis, we would need to know
whether the new regime of trustee control resulted in a more efficient allocation of resources, in
the strict economic sense, than the old system of judicially enforced donor control. Efforts to
resolve that issue are likely to be as convoluted, and as ultimately inconclusive, as the current
debate over whether the existing cy pres doctrine is more or less efficient than an alternative
more deferential to donors. Compare POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 33, at 508-10
(arguing that the present doctrine is more efficient) with Macey, supra note 7, at 303-06 (argu-
ing that increased deference to donors would be more efficient).
132. See Venable, supra note 126, at 719 (contrasting congregational with hierarchical ec-
clesiastical organization).
133. See David Horton Smith, The Role of the United Way in Philanthropy, in 2 RE-
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constituents of such charitable communities treat one another less than
charitably.
How is the state to respond to a charge by one of the organization's
constituents that another has violated the organization's own internal
regulations? What if, for example, someone argues not that a donation is
being illegally diverted from its original purpose, but that the decision to
change the use was not made in accordance with the organization's own
procedures for making such decisions?134 This, as others have noted, is
an ancient, and perhaps intractable, problem.1 35 It poses a trilemma with
the autonomy of private, nongovernmental organizations on the first
side, the sovereignty of the state on the second, and the civil rights of
individual citizens on the third.1 36
These problems cannot be fully resolved here. For present purposes,
the best that can be done is to point out that eliminating legal enforce-
ment of use restrictions does not require a resolution of the broader is-
sues. The sectarian alternative would remove only one substantive issue
from state determination, leaving donors and others with grievances
against nonprofits recourse to the civil courts for procedural complaints
and even substantive complaints that do not bear on changes in the use of
donated property for charitable purposes. Indeed, the sectarian alterna-
tive presupposes that the state will continue to set and enforce the stan-
dard fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
SEARCH PAPERS: PHILANTHROPIC FIELDS OF INTEREST 1353, 1363-65 (1977) (describing the
relationship of the United Way of America, as the national coordinating body, to its autono-
mous, separately incorporated local affiliates).
134. For an analysis of the surprisingly convoluted question of who has standing to sue
charities under these and other circumstances, see MARY GRACE BLASKO ET AL., STANDING
TO SUE IN THE CHARITABLE SECTOR (forthcoming 1993).
135. The internal affairs of religious organizations have particularly bedeviled the civil
courts. See Ira Mark Ellmann, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal
Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1378 (1981). The title of Ellmann's article is an allusion to
the Roman proconsul Gallio's refusal to hear charges brought by Jewish religious authorities
against the apostle Paul, as reported at Acts 18:14-16:
Gallio said to the Jews, "if it were a matter of wrongdoing or vicious crime, I should
have reason to bear with you, 0 Jews;
[B]ut since it is a matter of questions about words and names and your own law,
see to it yourselves; I refuse to be a judge of these things."
And he drove them from the tribunal.
Id. at 1380. The classic article on the general problem is Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Internal Af-
fairs ofAssociations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1936). For a more recent treatment,
see Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1963).
136. Thus, in the case of Paul, the Roman proconsul might claim to waive Rome's sover-
eign right to hear Paul's case, thus recognizing the autonomy of the Sanhedrin, but denying
Paul any claim he might have asserted as a Roman citizen to a civil trial. When Paul was
ultimately granted his appeal to Caesar, Acts 25:12, the latter's sovereignty and the former's
civil rights were vindicated at the expense of the Sanhedrin's autonomy.
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B. Paradoxical (and Perverse) Effects on Innovation
Might the elimination of legally enforceable dead hand control, cal-
culated to allow charities greater flexibility and wider room for innova-
tion, actually produce the opposite effect? This potential problem has
two aspects: one facing innovative donors seeking to found new chari-
ties, the other facing new organizations seeking donations.
The problem for innovative donors is that once they themselves
cease to control the organizations they create, as they must at death, they
will under my proposal have no legal assurance that their innovative
charitable wishes will continue. Here we find a dilemma: either hope, as
present law implicitly does, that innovative ideas will not become obso-
lescent, or hope, with my proposal, that the trustees of innovative donors
will continue in the spirit of their founders.
This dilemma has no perfect solution. But resting the hope of inno-
vation on charities themselves at the very least has time its on side. Even
the most original ideas will inevitably become timeworn, particularly in
the details of their implementation. The more innovative donors, those
who have created the great charitable foundations, 137 seem to have real-
ized this. Their charitable foundations tend either to have statements of
purpose virtually coterminous with the outer limits of charity, like the
Rockefeller Foundation's "advancement of humanity," 138 or to specify
particular charitable purposes that cover a wide front, like education,
health care, or the arts.139 Perhaps, too, donors endowing large founda-
tions anticipated that, at least with respect to organizations of the magni-
tude they created, informal controls would satisfactorily secure their
wishes.14° Finally, in return for permitting donors to devote societal re-
sources to purposes at the farthest margins of charity, it does not seem
too much to ask that donors leave behind a cadre of supporters willing to
137. For a defense of private foundations as significant sources of innovation, see
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 107, at 49-53 (discussing the role of foundations in a pluralistic
society); John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty under the Federal Tax System, 5 PROB. LAW. 1
(1978).
138. See WALDEMAR A. NIELSON, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 32, 35, 48, 50 (1972).
139. See NIELSON, supra note 138, at 80-81, 102; Paul N. Ylvisaker, Foundations and
Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 101, at 360, 374-77.
140. Their confidence in such informal control mechanisms does not appear to have been
misplaced. See NIELSON, supra note 138, at 279 (describing extensive degree of influence foun-
ders of great foundations were able to exercise through such means as family control of gov-
erning boards). The creation of a charitable alter ego staffed by those loyal to the donor's
vision approximates the ultimate means of informally enforcing agreements, which Kronman
calls "union." In that arrangement, the central source of uncertainty of performance, the
divergence of interest between the promisor and the promisee, is eliminated, not just reduced.
Kronman, supra note 42, at 20-23.
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carry out their instructions. If that proves to be too much for the perpet-
uation of some donors' wishes, it should be seen less as the stifling of
innovative ideas and more as the perishing of those that are unfit. 141
The problem for new organizations seeking donations is that, with-
out the ability to make legally binding promises to use donated funds for
the purposes for which they Were solicited, such organizations will be at
a disadvantage relative to older, established charities that can point to
their track record of deference to donor wishes. New organizations will
be less able to convincingly invoke informal enforcement mechanisms to
overcome potential donors' reluctance to make what would be un-
restricted gifts to charity under the sectarian alternative.
Real though this relative disadvantage is, it must be kept in perspec-
tive. Whether or not my proposal is adopted, the central problem for
new organizations will be their very novelty and lack of a track record.
Moreover, it is doubtful that their present ability to make legally binding
commitments to devote solicited funds to a particular charitable purpose
will make up for the lack of a track record. Contributors may at most be
only cursorily familiar with the law. Even if they know the law, the costs
of enforcing it on their behalf are obviously high. And even if the cost of
enforcement is borne by the public, the prospect of catching the fly-by-
night is slin. Finally, the real deterrent to giving to such organizations
will never be that they may devote their receipts to other charitable pur-
poses, or even that their insiders will simply grab the money and run. 142
More likely, it will be the fear that, even if they are entirely conscien-
tious, they may be inept or misguided. Without a track record, new
charities have no way to overcome this fear. As long as donors act on the
ancient maxim "By their fruits shall ye know them," transplant, upstart,
and offshoot charities will be at a decided disadvantage no matter how
well rooted their commitments are in legal obligation.
C. Skewing of Expenditures
Faced with the loss of legal enforcement of charities' promises to use
donations as they dictate, donors might try to lock in expenditures up
front by extralegal means to avoid frustration in the future. This might
have two undesirable effects. First, this practice might divert donations
141. See HOBHOUSE, supra note 24, at 224 (arguing that "ironbound rules of a founder"
are more likely to discourage than encourage innovation by charitable trusts).
142. For a detailed study of extensive recent efforts at the state and local level to regulate
charitable solicitations, and the generally hostile reception those efforts have received in the
Supreme Court, see Ellen Harris et al., Fundraising Into the 1990s" State Regulation of Chari-
table Solicitation After Riley, in 1 Topics IN PHILANTHROPY I (New York University School
of Law Program on Philanthropy and the Law ed., 1989).
July 1993] REFORMING CY PRES REFORM
from endowments to brick-and-mortar projects, as donors try to have
their wishes quite literally set in concrete. Second, it might encourage
present consumption at the expense of the future, as donors reason that a
dollar spent in an early year cannot be diverted in a later one.
It is not likely, however, that these urges would be more likely under
my proposal than under the present regime of dead hand control. Owing
to the fungibility of money, "contributions earmarked for one purpose,
even if scrupulously set aside, may simply free the [donee] organization
to use an equivalent amount of its own funds for other purposes."' 143
There are, that is to say, already great incentives in favor of bricks and
mortar. In addition, donors would have available to them the ful range
of informal enforcement techniques described above to ensure that their
contributions are used as they desire.
D. Creating a Market in Obsequiousness
There is, however, a danger that donors will employ informal en-
forcement measures with too great an effect. So far we have assumed
that trustees are committed to conscientiously balancing donor wishes
against evolving social needs. Donors could, however, find trustees with-
out a commitment to social good, trustees who, for the right price, would
elevate donor wishes to absolute priority. This possibility represents a
dark side of the market for reputational capital.144 For the sake of repeat
business, some trustees might be eager to cultivate a reputation for faith-
ful, even Pavlovian, responsiveness to donor wishes. The estate planning
field offers some evidence of this phenomenon already. Trusts with
mandatory distribution requirements can incur tax and other disadvan-
tages. 145 To avoid these, settlors sometimes write their chosen trustees
legally nonbinding (but usually honored) "letters of wishes" expressing
the settlor's distributional preferences.146 In the closely allied context of
charitable donations, the elimination of legally enforceable restrictions
could give rise to an analogous (and equally brisk) market in obsequi-
143. Atkinson, Altruism, supra note 93, at 584.
144. For the identification of this problem I am indebted to Harvey Dale, who pointed it
out when I presented a draft of this paper to the New York Nonprofit Forum on April 16,
1992.
145. See ROBERT C. LAWRENCE, INTERNATIONAL TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL INVESTORS 586-87 (2d ed. 1989).
146. Id. There are, however, limits to how far this practice can be pressed. If the govern-
ment can show a side agreement between the settlor and the trustee as to distributions, the
distribution will be deemed mandatory and the tax advantages lost. See Estate of Skinner v.
United States, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963); Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1049
(1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 2; Jerry J. McCoy, Zing Go the Strings if You're Not Careful: Recip-
rocal Trusts and Other Retained Powers Problems, 18 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 700 (1984).
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ousness, where anxious donors shop for trustees with well-earned and
carefully cultivated reputations for toadying. The net effect would
hardly be to enhance the flexibility of the use of charitable assets.
Robotically obedient trustees probably cannot be eliminated, but
their worst effects could be reduced by loosening the mainspring that
drives them: the financial incentive to follow donor directives reflexively.
The most intuitively appealing approach would be simply to forbid any
form of payment for making discretionary expenditures as directed by
the donor. Unfortunately, the practical impossibility of enforcing this
approach negates its conceptual elegance. "Wink and nod" arrange-
ments between donors and paid trustees would be hard to detect, as they
are in other areas now.147 As long as trustees are paid to perform discre-
tionary functions in the disposition of assets, determining whether discre-
tion is being exercised independently of donor direction will be difficult,
if not impossible. The market in obsequiousness, therefore, may have to
be combatted with a prophylactic rule prohibiting the acceptance of com-
pensation for exercising expenditure discretion.
A sweeping ban on such compensation would effectively forbid
charities to pay their trustees at all, a harsher result than is probably
necessary to address the problem of selling obsequiousness. It should be
enough to target those who are the agents or employees of financial insti-
tutions, and perhaps those who serve as paid trustees in their private
capacities for more than a specified number of charities. Even those
within the targeted group need not be forbidden to accept compensation
for exercising discretion in the investment, as opposed to the expenditure,
of charitable assets. Thus, charities that find delegating investment deci-
sions to institutional experts more economical than performing them in-
house would still be free to do so.148
147. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. Such arrangements are common, for
example, in "Medicaid estate planning," in which the nonindigent elderly artificially impover-
ish themselves with gifts to relatives to qualify for Medicaid. See ARMOND D. BUDISH,
AVOIDING THE MEDICAID TRAP 40 (1990); Brian E. Barreira, An Irrevocable Grantor Trust
Can Assure Eligibility for Medicaid, 16 EsT. PLAN. 104 (1989); Julie Kosterlitz, Middle-Class
Medicaid, 23 NAT'L 3. 2728 (1991); Laura Saunders, The King Lear Strategy, FORBES, Dec. 9,
1991, at 164.
148. See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 10, § 379, at 316-17 nn.6-7 and accompanying
text (stating it is "not improper" to delegate the power of investment to a committee, an of-
ficer, or an outsider as long as the board itself prudently exercises general supervision over the
matter). See also THE REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 3.02 & cmt., 6.40 & cmt.,
8.01 & cmt., and 8.25 & cmt. (American Bar Association 1987) (stating that investment pow-
ers may be delegated, but board members must exercise care in both the delegation to and
supervision of the outsider); UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS AT § 5 (1972)
(permitting delegation to agents of the investment of institutional funds).
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E. Constitutional Problems
Would the elimination of legal enforcement of dead hand control
violate constitutional restrictions on the taking of private property 149 or
the impairment of contracts? 150 Here we must distinguish between pro-
spective and retroactive application. The latter poses the only real
problems, and they can be readily overcome.
Retroactive elimination of dead hand control implicates the Takings
Clause because it would technically deprive donors and their successors
in interest of reversionary rights that may become possessory under pres-
ent law if the donor's original charitable purpose fails.151 Even if this
deprivation were held to be a taking requiring just compensation, that
would not impose much of an impediment to the reform suggested here.
The likely value of these reversionary interests would be low, given the
remote prospect of their ever becoming possessory, 152 and could thus be
acquired in eminent domain or analogous proceedings at little cost. 153
The present scope of the Contracts Clause is less certain than that of
the Takings Clause, 154 but should pose no insurmountable hurdles to the
149. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.").
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... ").
151. Scott and Fratcher deal dismissively with Takings Clause objections to traditional cy
pres reform: "The legislature has power, of course, by general acts to liberalize the doctrine of
cy pres, applicable to all trusts, whether created before or after the enactment." ScoTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 10, at 556 n.7. But what I am suggesting is much farther-reaching than
what they have in mind. Compare Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 12-
13 (1990) (recognizing that reversionary interests in abandoned railroad rights of way may be
protected by the Takings Clause) with Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat) 518, 642 (1819) (holding that donors' "descendants may take no interest in the
preservation of" the funds given to the college).
152. This is all the more true now that the federal tax laws forbid the retaining of partial
interests in donated property except in narrowly circumscribed circumstances, including when
the likelihood of reversion is remote. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(e) (1992).
153. There should be no problem with the constitutional requirement that takings of pri-
vate property be for a "public use"; that requirement is now deemed coterminous with the
states' very broad police powers. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240
(1984). Moreover, special legislation could perhaps empower charities themselves to exercise
this power. The legislature may constitutionally delegate their power of eminent domain to
private corporations and individuals. See JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 3.21[2] (rev. 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter NICHOLS']. This would further mini-
mize the role of state agencies in the management of charitable assets in the post-cy pres world.
For the proposition that delegation of the power of eminent domain to private corporations is
well settled law, see Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878), and NICHOLS', supra,
§ 3.21[2].
154. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 619-28 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing a limited, and probably short-lived, revival of the Contracts Clause in the 1970s
after decades of virtual desuetude).
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retroactive elimination of dead hand control. Despite the Contracts
Clause's explicit wording and obvious intent-preventing states from im-
pairing the obligations of contracts between private parties-it is now
seldom enforced unless the state itself is a party to the contract allegedly
impaired. 155 That, of course, could be said to be true of charitable gifts:
the state perpetually enforces donor wishes as to the disposition of prop-
erty, but only for public purposes. By removing the perpetual enforce-
ment but letting the property remain in public use, the state would avoid
the burden of its bargain while retaining the benefit.
As with the Takings Clause, however, this reneging on the state's
part should be redressable by paying compensation. The Contracts
Clause has long been held to permit changing the remedies available for a
contract's enforcement, as opposed to the substantive terms of the con-
tract itself. Although at some point changing remedies becomes indistin-
guishable from changing substantive provisions, 156 this is hardly what is
happening if full compensation is being paid donors or their successors in
interest. Thus, as with the Takings Clause, the worst case scenario
would be that the cy pres doctrine could be abolished retroactively, but
only if frustrated pre-abolition donors or their successors were
compensated.
The prospective elimination of legal enforcement of restrictions
made on future gifts should present no takings problem at all. Present
property owners would be left with far more latitude in the use and dis-
position of their property than the Supreme Court has held in other con-
texts to be necessary to withstand a Takings Clause attack.1 57 With
respect to the Contracts Clause, prospective application would similarly
pose no problem.1 58
VII. Conclusion
Reformers have long argued that the doctrine of cy pres is due for
an overhaul. But their insistence on staying within the existing bipolar
framework, balancing sacrosanct donor direction against presumptively
state-determined conceptions of the public good, has limited the scope of
reform to marginal tinkerings. Meanwhile the notion of charity has
155. IL
156. d at 615-17.
157. See, eg., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (holding that the prohibition of the
sale of Native American artifacts made from the feathers of endangered eagles is not a taking
of the artifacts because their owners were left with other rights, including the right to possess
and to transfer gratuitously).
158. TRIBE, supra note 154, at 614-15.
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evolved away from a monolithic concept of the public good and toward
an appreciation of the virtues of pluralism and diversity. The idea of
state-determined performance standards is at odds with this evolution.
At the same time, the need for charity to respond rapidly to social
change has become increasingly clear; the tradition of rigid dead hand
control is in conflict with this need. If we come to see charities as living
altruistic communities acting in their own right, rather than as servants
of two competing masters, individual donors on the one hand and the
state on the other, the traditional doctrine of cy pres will have no role.
Or perhaps cy pres will have one final, paradoxical role-presiding
over its own demise. Cy pres, formerly applied on a piecemeal basis to
rid particular charities of outworn restrictions, could finally work to free
the entire charitable sector from two constraints that have outlived their
utility: dead hand control and statist definition of the public good. Cy
pres, the ancient source of incremental charitable reform, thus contains
the seeds, not so much of its own destruction, as of its own
transcendence.
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Appendix
In an earlier piece I suggested that all truly nonprofit organizations,
with the sole exception of mutual benefit organizations, embody an essen-
tial element of altruism, and that this element of altruism is a sufficient
criterion of charitable status for purposes of federal income tax exemp-
tion. 159 Part of my purpose in thus liberalizing the definition of charity
was (with apologies to Chairman Mao) to let a thousand flowers bloom,
to permit a broader and healthier range of experimentation in the field of
charity than existing law allows.
This proposal posed a problem that I noted, but did not address at
length, in the final pages of my earlier paper: What about organizations
that are devoted to purposes that are not illegal, but are silly or frivolous
or stupid? "It could be argued," I admitted there,
that the permissiveness of the altruism theory threatens to... permit a
luxuriant crop of useless, if not noxious, weeds to grow in the garden
of charity. This problem is compounded, so the argument would run,
by the fact that the lives of charities are unlimited; mutant charities
should be chopped down before they take root, not allowed to go on
bearing their insipid-or baneful-fruit forever.16°
In response, I suggested that the vices of eccentricity would, to my mind
at least, seldom overshadow the virtues of diversity. I concluded that
traditional cy pres doctrine might apply as an ultimate control mecha-
nism, but I had deep misgivings on that score:
As the list of useless purposes to be weeded out grows longer, it threat-
ens to become a requirement that only certain favored purposes be al-
lowed to thrive. Once the shears are in hand, all it takes is an
overzealous gardener to carve the rambling vegetation of a country
retreat into the strictly classical geometry of the topiary at
Versailles. 161
The problem, I now realize, was a false dilemma. For in trimming
the outer borders of charity, we need not choose between the rigor mor-
tised hands of eccentric donors and the long (and perhaps overly ener-
getic) arms of the state. In this Article I explore a third option, placing
the fate of charitable organizations' assets squarely in the organizations'
own hands-helping hands, I earlier hoped they would be.162 Thus it
may be less that this discussion is an appendix to the present Article, and
more that the present Article is an extended footnote to my altruism
piece. I should note, however, that virtually all of the criticism of re-
159. Atkinson, Altruism, supra note 93, at 618, 630-32.
160. Id. at 636.
161. Id. at 637.
162. Id. at 638.
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formed cy pres theory that I set out in Parts III and IV of this paper
apply whether you accept my expansive, altruism theory of charity or the
narrower, traditional theory. Rather than insist that the world be seen
from my own admittedly idiosyncratic perspective, I deal almost exclu-
sively in this Article with the standard definition of charity, amorphous
and ultimately unsatisfactory though I and others believe it to be.163 The
broader definition of charity onto which my proposal for cy pres reform
might be grafted is, accordingly, buried in this appendix and in footnotes.
163. See sources cited supra note 95.
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